South Caucasus

Tens of thousands of people took to the streets of the Georgian capital Tbilisi on Sunday evening, to protest against a proposed law that would brand most of the country's civil society organisations as "foreign agents" for receiving financial support from overseas sources. With the government defiant, the country appears to be heading for one of its most acute political crisis in decades. The decision of the Georgian Dream government to defy the country’s president, opposition, civil society, and practically the entire international community, by re-introducing a controversial law which will categorise most civil society organisations as “foreign agents” has created a deep rift, with both sides adamant that they will take the issue “to the end” In the last few days, the streets of Tbilisi have been taken over by continuous mass rallies with the slogan “Yes to Europe, No to Russian Law”. Until last night protestors lacked a critical mass, but this has now changed. The protests are led mainly by youth and student organisations. The largely discredited Georgian opposition appears content to support the protests from behind.  So far there have been only a few incidents, but as the number of protestors grows, this can change very quickly. In the meantime, the government will today bring out its own supporters on the streets. The European Parliament last week called for sanctions against Georgian leaders, including the Honorary President and founder of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili. It is unlikely that the European Commission and European Council will do so yet, but this option is now seen not only as a distinct possibility, but as being inevitable if the Georgian government pushes ahead with the controversial law. Events on the ground will determine how fast things will move. Georgia faces difficult parliamentary elections in the autumn, but it seems the current crisis will come to a head before then.

The geopolitics of the South Caucasus is as unpredictable as ever. Even as recently as the beginning of April, few, if any, would have imagined that Russia may withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan anytime soon. Many observers were even skeptical about the possibility of their withdrawal in November 2025 – the date which was stipulated in the November 2020 trilateral statement as the potential but not fixed date for the ending of the peacekeeping mission of Russia. This skepticism was grounded in the understanding that for Russia, Karabakh holds paramount importance in the broader context of the South Caucasus. In the wake of Russia’s unexpected withdrawal of its peacekeeping mission from the Karabakh region, the South Caucasus enters a new geopolitical dynamic. This historic development not only signifies Azerbaijan's attainment of complete sovereignty over its territories but also heralds the definitive end of the Karabakh conflict. President Ilham Aliyev's adept diplomatic maneuvers have secured Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and positioned Baku as a confident actor on the regional stage. The withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers marks a pivotal moment, shaping the future landscape of Azerbaijan-Russia relations and regional geopolitics. As Azerbaijan charts its course forward, its commitment to regional integration remains, however, steadfast, with a focus on strengthening ties within the Turkic world.

The announcement of the return of the four non-enclave villages of Baghanis Ayrim, Ashagi Askipara, Kheyrimli, and Gizilhajili comes as a welcome development. That is not to say that there won’t be problems as the physical process of delimitation/demarcation takes place, and military forces are replaced by border guards, and nor does it ignore the distinct lack of trust between Yerevan and Baku, but it does highlight the need for more focused work in order to build confidence between the sides. Pashinyan has already hinted at the idea of trade between the two communities at some point in an albeit distant future but this is also a region that has experienced significant cross-border incidents for over 30 years. The task won’t be simple, but civil society in both countries could and should play an important role alongside the work of the two governments.

Armenia and Azerbaijan last week announced they had agreed on the process of demarcation of their border in the Tavush region that will result in the return of four villages that had been under Armenian control since the conflict in the 1990s to Azerbaijan. The agreement is being seen as a milestone event that will greatly contribute to finalising the process leading towards the signing of a peace agreement between the two countries, who have been in conflict for more than three decades. The agreement comes after months of negotiations, and controversy, including some opposition from Armenian residents in the proximity of the four villages. On 19 April, it was announced that the eighth meeting of the Committee on Demarcation and Border Security of the State Border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan and the State Committee on the Demarcation of the State Border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia was held under the chairmanship of Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan and Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafaev. There are of course many small details that will have to be ironed out later, but the fact that the sides have agreed the basic parameters, and especially their re-affirmation that they will "be guided by Alma Ata's 1991 Declaration in the demarcation process" is a huge step forward. No wonder that the international community in the last few days have lined up to congratulate the two sides on their success and to nudge them forward to complete the process of signing a peace agreement between them. Seasoned observers now see the signing of such an agreement as being truly within reach. Of course, there will be those who for one reason or another will not like these developments and will try to spoil the process. Armenia and Azerbaijan must remain focused on overcoming any last obstacles, and on its part, the international community must also remain focused in helping them do so as a priority.

Nikol Pashinyan is a populist. Whether on the domestic or international scene, it is difficult to consider him a statesman. Populism defines his words and permeates his actions. But in comparison with those leaders before him, he is also a rarity in Armenia’s post-independence history – he is a democratically elected leader.Nikol Pashinyan is a populist. Whether on the domestic or international scene, it is difficult to consider him a statesman. Populism defines his words and permeates his actions. But in comparison with those leaders before him, he is also a rarity in Armenia’s post-independence history – he is a democratically elected leader. Perhaps, if populism arguably contributed to the last war and the loss of Karabakh it could also be used to usher in a new era of peace and regional integration, coincidentally relegating nationalist narratives and mythologies of old to the annuls of history. It will also prove instrumental to maintaining Pashinyan's rule. In 2013 he already used the slogan of “Real Armenia” but at that time to rally for an Armenia without Serzh Sargsyan. In 2018 it succeeded.