"The Armenian government and Armenian society have reached the limits of concessions on Nagorno Karabakh, and any agreement which will not explicitly secure a long-term and solid international presence in Nagorno Karabakh (either through the deployment of peacekeeping forces or a large-size mission) will be rejected by the majority of the population", writes Benyamin Poghosyan in this op-ed for commonspace.eu.
He adds that "it should be clear to the international community that any new government in Armenia will pursue a tougher policy on the issues related to Nagorno Karabakh and relations with Azerbaijan. Thus, all those external actors, who are interested in the stability of the region, should understand that any additional pressure on the Armenian government to drop its demands for a solid international presence in Nagorno Karabakh, and failure to explicitly secure that presence in the peace agreement, is a recipe for significant political destabilization in Armenia, and has the potential of ruining the ongoing Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process, and bring the region back to a renewed cycle of violence."
After a break of several months Armenia and Azerbaijan have now resumed their engagement in peace negotiations in earnest. After a face-to-face meeting between leaders in Munich in February, the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of foreign affairs went to Washington in early May 2023 to take part in the most intensive round of negotiations ever held since the Spring 2001 Key West summit between Presidents Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. The ministers achieved progress, opening the path for the 14 May Brussels summit involving Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Aliyev, and President of the European Union Council Charles Michel. On 19 May, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Moscow, and a trilateral Aliyev - Pashinyan - Putin summit is scheduled for 25 May.
The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan will then move to Chisinau on 1 June to hold another round of negotiation in the margins of the second summit of the European Political Community with the participation of Charles Michel, French President Macron, and German Chancellor Scholz. The next stop of Pashinyan and Aliyev will be Brussels again in late June or early July 2023, while another summit will take place in early October 2023 in Granada during the third summit of the European Political Community. For the first time in the 29 years long negotiation process, leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan will have three meetings in 17 days. The frequency of the meetings sends a clear signal that the sides work not on abstract principles but on concrete documents, and even those experts who have accompanied the process for many years and who had become used to false hopes are now saying that the signature of an agreement by the end of 2023 may be within reach.
The Armenian government has reached the limit of concessions it is able or willing to accept
As negotiations enter a crucial phase, the primary task of all those genuinely interested in achieving lasting peace and stability in the region is to avoid any steps that may jeopardize the process and open the way for a return to conflict. As the text of the agreement under discussion has not been published yet, it is difficult to assess it. But one fact is clear: the Armenian government, led by Prime Minister Pashinyan, has reached the limit of concessions it is able or willing to accept in its quest for a solution.
The Armenian Government's willingness to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan within the 1991 Alma-Ata declaration, and its readiness to solidify this recognition by using concrete numbers of square kilometers, as was done by Prime Minister Pashinyan during his speech on 17 May 2023, at the 4th Council of Europe summit in Reykjavik, should not be taken lightly. The same applies to the Armenian government's willingness to drop any demands for an autonomous status for Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan, and to limit its demands to only calling for an international presence in the region to secure the rights of Armenians living there.
Many outside Armenia believe that the results of the June 2021 early parliamentary elections in Armenia have proved that the majority of Armenians accepted the results of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, that the same majority does not care about the fate of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenians living there, and will accept any solution to the conflict. Others argue that Armenia is too weak to resist and must accept every demand by Azerbaijan.
As proof of this logic, they argue that after May and November 2021 and September 2022 Azerbaijani attacks against Armenia, the government demanded the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from occupied territories to continue negotiations but then re-entered the process without any changes on the ground. The same logic may apply to the situation around the Lachin corridor. Armenia protested when Azerbaijani self-described eco-activists closed the corridor on 12 December 2022, and demanded to end the blockade. However, Azerbaijan did not pay any attention to these demands and established a checkpoint along the corridor on April 23, 2023, solidifying the blockade.
Meanwhile, Armenia continued negotiations and even failed to ensure that the issue of the blockade featured in the statement made by Michel after the 14 May trilateral summit. All these events may create a false perception that Armenian society is either ready to accept a solution that will result in the de facto de-Armenization of Nagorno Karabakh or is too weak to resist this outcome. Thus, Azerbaijan may continue to push forward its agenda, rejecting any calls for an international presence in Nagorno Karabakh and forcing the "accept Azerbaijani passports or leave Nagorno Karabakh" agenda on Armenia and Armenians living in Nagorno Karabakh.
If society perceives the new agreement as outright capitulation, the lengthy procedure of ratification will seriously destabilize the domestic political situation in Armenia with unclear implications
However, this perception is not accurate. The recently published results of the sociological survey conducted by the International Republican Institute showed that 52 percent of respondents believed that the country was heading in the wrong direction (In August 2018, this number was only 14 percent), only 14 percent trusted Prime Minister Pashinyan, only 21 percent was ready to vote for the ruling Civil Contract party, and 69 percent argued that the direction of Armenian policy on Nagorno Karabakh regressed during the last six months.
The Armenian government and Armenian society have reached the limits of concessions on Nagorno Karabakh, and any agreement which will not explicitly secure a long-term and solid international presence in Nagorno Karabakh (either through the deployment of peacekeeping forces or a large-size mission) will be rejected by the majority of the population. The future Armenia – Azerbaijan agreement is not a statement that can be signed and implemented by a single person, even if he is the prime minister.
Armenia has a special law on international agreements adopted by the National Assembly in March 2018, which stipulates a lengthy and complicated process for the ratification of any international agreement, with the involvement of hundreds of civil servants, judges of the Constitutional Court, and members of the parliament. If society perceives the new agreement as outright capitulation, the lengthy procedure of ratification will seriously destabilize the domestic political situation in Armenia with unclear implications.
Meanwhile, it should be clear to the international community that any new government in Armenia will pursue a tougher policy on the issues related to Nagorno Karabakh and relations with Azerbaijan. Thus, all those external actors, who are interested in the stability of the region, should understand that any additional pressure on the Armenian government to drop its demands for a solid international presence in Nagorno Karabakh, and failure to explicitly secure that presence in the peace agreement, is a recipe for significant political destabilization in Armenia, and has the potential of ruining the ongoing Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiation process, and bring the region back to a renewed cycle of violence.
