Opinion: Harmonising the different formats in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations

Over the last year multiple formats have emerged in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, and three main external players: Russia, the EU and the US are involved in the mediation process. This may lead to some confusion, says Benyamin Poghosyan in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. Big power rivalry may also negatively impact the process. Poghosyan argues some co-ordinating mechanism is necessary, and a format, at least involving Russia and the EU, could also help to combine their efforts.

While the South Caucasus marked the second anniversary of the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, negotiations to sign a peace agreement between Armenia – Azerbaijan have become increasingly complex. If during the first year after the war, it was Russia that almost exclusively controlled the process, now we have many actors with contradicting interests and visions. The EU entered the game first, organizing four summits between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in the period of December 2021 – August 2022, simultaneously launching a new format of negotiations between the Secretary of the Armenian security council and top foreign policy aide to President Aliyev. Russia was watching the growing EU involvement in the process, messaging its concerns about the EU's desire to take the initiative from the Kremlin. However, the appearance of the US as a driver of Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations, after the September 13-14, 2022 Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia, raised alarm bells in Russia. President Putin publicly spoke about the so-called "Washington version of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan," which presumably recognized Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. while hinting that according to Russia's perception, the issue of the final status of Nagorno Karabakh status should be postponed. The Russian ambassador in Armenia articulated this vision further, claiming that the best scenario was to leave the issue of Nagorno Karabakh status to the next generations. The US denied that it had presented the sides a draft peace treaty, arguing that its role was to provide a space for the sides to conduct discussions. However, apparently, Russia was not happy to see American involvement here. 

Expert communities and broader layers of society in Armenia and Azerbaijan sought to grasp the differences between or even the mere existence of “Russian," 'European," and "American" versions of peace agreements. Meanwhile, the idea of signing a peace agreement by the end of 2022 came to the surface after September 27, 2022, meeting between the Secretary of the Armenian security council and top foreign policy aide to President Aliyev at the White House. This idea surprised many as too ambitious, given the need for more clarity on what was agreed and what was not agreed between the sides.

The next step was the Prague statement adopted at the first summit of the European political community on October 6, 2022. Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to recognize each other’s territorial integrity within the Alma-Ata declaration of December 1991. However, according to a long-standing Armenian position, Nagorno Karabakh declared its independence citing the principle of the peoples right for self-determination. Another significant result of the Prague meeting was the deployment of 40 unarmed EU observers along parts of the Armenia – Azerbaijan international border for two months.  Many in Armenia believe that the mission's deployment should be extended and the number of observers should be increased.

As military failures in Ukraine shattered the perception of Russia’s military strength in many parts of the world, including in the South Caucasus, the Kremlin sought to regain the position of chief mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan by organizing a leaders' summit in Sochi on October 31, 2022. According to the Armenian read-out, Azerbaijan rejected Russia's offers to include in the final statement any mention of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as dismissed an Armenian offer to extend the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh beyond 2025, for an additional ten or even twenty years. However, during the Sochi meeting, Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed the significant role of the Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh while reiterating mutual recognition of territorial integrity within the Alma-Ata declaration.

In parallel with the meetings between leaders, ministers of foreign affairs, the Secretary of the Armenian security council, and top foreign policy aide to President Aliyev, the trilateral Armenia – Azerbaijan – Russia commission on restoration of communications, established in early 2021, continues its activities. Another bilateral Armenia – Azerbaijan commission on border delimitation and demarcation held its third meeting in Brussels on November 3, 2022.

Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations continue in different layers and through the mediation of different actors. The peace process comprises five layers - summits between leaders; discussions between ministers of foreign affairs; meetings between the Secretary of the Armenian security council and top foreign policy aide to President Aliyev; discussions of the commission on restoration of communications; meetings of the commission on border delimitation and demarcation. Meetings are convened by different mediators Russia, the EU, and the US. Given the ongoing Russia – US confrontation due to the war in Ukraine, where the EU fully supports the US, the direct involvement of Russia, the US, and the EU in the negotiation process complicates the situation. It potentially makes Armenia – Azerbaijan relations and the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement process another battlefield for the Russia – West confrontation. The five different layers of negotiations create some confusion, as sometimes discussions and tentative agreements within one layer are not taken into account the negotiations in other layers.

One of the ways to reduce the confusion and to create some clarity could be the convening of comprehensive summits with the participation of all Armenian and Azerbaijani actors involved in negotiations – to have at the same place and at the same time leaders, ministers of foreign affairs, Armenian Secretary of the security council and President's Aliyev top foreign policy aid, and the members of the two commissions dealing with the restoration of communications and border delimitation issues. Simultaneous negotiations may at least decrease the ambiguity on what is achievable and what is not.

The other option would be to combine the efforts of at least two mediators. The current level of Russia – US relations precludes any joint mediation efforts, but there is room to discuss the convening of a comprehensive Armenia – Azerbaijan summit with the joint participation of EU and Russian officials. No one accepts the presence in the same room of President Putin and President Michel or Minister Lavrov and the EU High representative for foreign Affairs and security policy Borrell. However, a meeting facilitated and attended by the EU Special representative in the South Caucasus and the Russian deputy foreign minister responsible for the South Caucasus may be a realistic option.

 

source: Benyamin Poghosyan is the founder and Chairman of the Centre for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan. 
photo:  One of the various current formats for Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations - the meeting hosted by the EU in Prague on 6 October 2022
The views expressed in opinion pieces and commentaries do not necessarily reflect the position of commonspace.eu or its partners.

Latest

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).
Editor's choice
News
UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Role of Diplomacy during Active Hostilities

UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Role of Diplomacy during Active Hostilities

The United Nations Security Council is today expected to adopt a presidential statement on the role of diplomacy during active hostilities. The draft text, which was authored by Pakistan, underscores the importance of maintaining diplomatic engagement even after the outbreak of armed conflict, with a view to containing escalation, facilitating cessations of hostilities and ceasefires, and creating conditions conducive to peaceful political settlements. Resolution 2788 of 22 July 2025, which was initiated by Pakistan, reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A year later, on 23 July, the Council convened an open debate to review the resolution’s implementation and examine ways of making more effective use of the peaceful dispute settlement tools available under Chapter VI.   The draft presidential statement builds on previous Council products, such as resolution 2788, but it is the first to focus specifically on the role of diplomacy in containing and de-escalating active hostilities. Since the open debate in July, Council members have continued to call for intensified efforts towards de-escalation and dialogue, although differences persist over how proactively the Council should promote mediation and other peaceful means of dispute settlement, particularly in situations where the consent of the parties is contested. In his statement opening the general debate of the 81st session of the General Assembly on 22 September, Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted the devastating consequences of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Sudan, and the Middle East, warning that these and other crises illustrate what happens when “force outpaces diplomacy” and stressing the urgency of sustained diplomatic engagement. The negotiations on the draft presidential statement do not appear to have been particularly contentious, although Council members expressed differing views on some elements of the text. Pakistan circulated the initial draft to Council members on 14 October. Following informal consultations with Council members to address comments on the initial draft, Pakistan circulated a first revised draft on 23 October, incorporating several proposed amendments. On 29 October, Pakistan circulated a second revised draft, which it placed under silence procedure until the following day (30 October). After the US broke silence, a third revised draft was circulated on 3 November and placed under silence procedure until this morning (4 November). The draft subsequently passed silence. The agreed presidential statement emphasises the importance of maintaining direct and indirect channels of communication between parties to armed conflict to reduce the risk of miscalculation and create opportunities for sustained political engagement. (click image to read more)

Popular

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996,  Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe.  But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides.   Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan  saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)