Armenian analyst Dr Eduard Abrahamyan argues in this article for commonspace.eu that changes in the regional and global situation are leading to a rethink of policies by Iran, Armenia and others.
We are currently witnessing pivotal changes in regional and global policies as a result of the thaw in US-Iran relations, Europe's quest to seek alternative gas supplies, and more recently the prospect of Iran collaborating with NATO and the United States in the face of a common enemy in the Middle East.
The escalation of tension with Russia may negatively impact Europe's ability to satisfy its demand for natural gas. Russia's determination to play a decisive role in Europe's energy market constrains the EU to seek alternative means of gas transportation from a more reliable supplier. Western powers are aspiring to contain Russian geopolitical ambitions by diversification in the energy field in order to reduce their energy dependence on Russia. In other words, the EU and the US wish to induce Russia to relinquish its newly-achieved military-political positions in Ukraine by means of economic restrictions. As well as these economic sanctions, key decision-makers and political ideologists in the Western world are elaborating a new system of global economy and security which includes predictable and responsible partners in the East and Asia, in order to isolate Russia.
Iran sees a window of opportunity.
One of the key issues affecting the international community is the political role and position of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the strength of the evolution of political confrontation between the West and Russia, Iran has realized that it can provide specific geographic and economic opportunities for the EU and the United States. Hassan Rouhani's political team have adopted a policy of rapprochement with the United States and other Western nations in order to embrace the economic and geopolitical opportunities involved in playing a vital role in geopolitics of the Near East and the energy and communications systems of the world.
Iran has always been a rival of Russia in the Caspian region and Central Asia and now, against the background of deepen escalation of conflict between US-EU and Russia, the Iranian leadership has gradually improved its relationship with the West in order to counterbalance Russian interests. The view of Iranian policy-makers is rather simple: allying with the West by supporting stability in the Middle East is far more beneficial to them than adopting a pro-Russian political orientation. Additionally, Iran may become a long-term partner of the EU and the US, not only in the area of energy, but also in the role of a regional partner in helping restrict Russian economic and military-politic influence in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Russia's new ambitions have created the circumstances for the geopolitical convergence of the United States, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Attempts at coordinating a struggle against ISIL with Tehran and the conspicuous efforts of the Obama administration to normalize the ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia may be a precursor for the fuller involvement of Tehran in global economic and geopolitical affairs. From a pragmatic point of view, if the tendency towards rapprochement between the West and Iran persists, Iran may feasibly prefer to be consolidated with western policy toward Russia. On the other hand, by achieving some co-ordination with Western interests, Iran may partially assume some role for the restoration of stability and security in the Middle East. In support of this notion is not only the constructive position of Hassan Rouhani towards former rivals - Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also his desire to build close ties with pro-western oriented Egyptian authorities.
One of the main benefits of rapprochement with Iran will be felt by the European Union. One useful advantage of EU-Iran relationship is the colossal capacity for deployment of Iranian energy resources. This could lead to it replacing Russia as a dominant gas supplier for Europe.
It is noteworthy that one of the main goals of the Nabucco gas-transporting project is for it to become a proper competitor to Russian gas domination. To make this alternative possible, plans to involve Azerbaijani and Turkmenistan in collaboration with the Iranian gas fields have been mooted for the future. Unfortunately, the development of this project is still being hampered by the economic sanctions on Iran that remain in place. However, in the process of defreezing the US-Iran relationship there may be a chance that this project will take off. Interestingly, during the current year, as the crisis in the Ukraine has grown, the Iranian authorities have repeatedly emphasized the possibility of Iran becoming a leading gas supplier in the world.
One politically and economically efficient and profitable feature of the new project may be a gas pipeline route across the territories of Armenia and Georgia, through the Black Sea to the European Union. The lack of guarantees of security caused by the new challenges of Russian policy in post-Soviet space and the potential economic perspectives may induce Armenia and Georgia to become a decisive supporter of this plan. A gas pipeline through Armenia and Georgia would promote the sovereignty of these states and considerably relieve them from the effects of the policy of isolating them politically and territorially that Russia has pursued.
The presence of Georgia and Armenia as politically united subjects within the same pro-western orientation could help create a significant military-political factor of security and stability in the east of the Black Sea region. Simultaneously, by being integrated into Euro-Atlantic global security system, Georgia and Armenia could not only assume a constraining role on Russia's ambitions in the Black Sea region, but could also impact on the diversification of political relationships. Moreover, as new partners in NATO, Georgia and Armenia could also provide security and stability in gas transportation from Iran to Europe.
Georgia, and especially Armenia, have now developed bilateral relations with Iran. In addition, Iran is interested in reducing the economic and political impact of Russia on Armenia, and there is some discontent in the country about the Armenian leadership's hesitant attitude towards the West. Moreover, in view of the amplification of the Kremlin's destructive policy in the Caucasus and Middle Asia, as well as its unacceptable positions on the delineation of the maritime boundaries in the Caspian Sea, Tehran would accept the permanent comprehensive integration of Georgia and Armenia within NATO and the EU. In such a scenario, Iran could attempt to involve the West in Caspian problems.
Iran considers Turkey as its traditional competitor in the Caucasus and the Middle East, which is why Tehran has no enthusiasm to co-operate with Ankara in natural gas transportation, in spite of the fact that Iran is the second-largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey, after Russia. Some European experts are also concerned about the future increase in Turkish influence on Europe, if there is a final confirmation of the gas-pipeline route that is to be laid across the territory of Turkey. If this were to occur, Ankara would gain the additional opportunity of having an impact on Turkish-EU relations. Thus, the participation of Turkey within the alternative gas project for Europe would be difficult, especially with regard to the background of strategic and geopolitical convergence between Turkey and Russia. In fact, there is a gas pipeline route from Turkmenistan across Iran to Turkey, but it has been constructed for Turkish needs only. Therefore, the only safe and profitable direction for the pipeline is Armenia to Georgia.
There is an assumption that one of Nabucco's latest projections of the gas-pipeline from Tabriz (Iran) to Armenia, which is now functioning, may also involve Georgia. Indeed, the diameter of the gas pipeline in Armenia is smaller than it is in Iran, and this should not prevent it reaching Georgia. Accordingly, the construction of capable gas terminals in Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, as well as the routes though the Black Sea, can be an additional reason for the tangible military-naval presence of NATO in the Black Sea. This presence may partly fulfill the newly created Romanian and Georgian military fleet. The fastest way of transporting natural gas from Georgia to Bulgaria, and from Romania and Ukraine, may be through the liquefaction of the gas in a facility near the port of Poti (Georgia), with further transportation by LNG carriers. This means of transportation is rather effective, as the LNG market is growing rapidly. Interestingly, Georgia already has some experience of transporting LNG to Bulgaria and Romania, but the quantity of gas involved is as yet not significant. Also, there is the issue of whether this type of transportation from Iran is cheaper and safer than a gas pipeline under the Black Sea. Transportation by LNG carriers has a considerable advantage in comparison with a fixed gas-pipeline under the sea due to the flexibility, including in the routes of transportation. On the other hand, a fixed gas pipeline increases a countries' dependence on a particular supplier, and thus its vulnerability.
Can Armenia follow Georgia's path?
After the NATO summit in Cardiff of 4-5 of September 2014, where Georgia, by virtue of its long-term loyalty, obtained a new status in preparation for joining NATO, pro-Atlantic communities in Armenia, particularly military officials and progressive members of society, received this news as a unique inspiration. It meant that Armenia could seek concrete and tangible opportunities to intensify the processes of accession to NATO and that Moscow could not react to this tendency. Moreover, there is an intention to forge a regional system of defense and security with Georgia, with all that it implies for Moscow. It is hoped that this decision will finally lead to the establishment of a strong democracy in Armenia.
However, there are a number of barriers to the achievement of this project, such as the difficulties and controversies surrounding Iran that are still waiting for solutions, as well as the hesitation of the Armenian government as a result of Russia's interference in its decision-making. There is also the matter of the presence of the Russian 102nd military base in Armenia, not far from Georgian border. However, membership of NATO and an emphasis on close ties between Georgia and Armenia are inevitable, as this is a vital factor required to bring about energy solutions in the region, and the formation of new approaches and meanings for the global economy.
source: This article was contributed to commonspace.eu by Armenian analyst Dr Eduard Abrahamayan.
Photo: Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan being welcomed by the Secretary-General of NATO as he arrives at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014.
