There is no denying that the EU, especially key member states acting in support, helped bring Baku and Yerevan closer to the Washington Declaration of August 8, 2025. But a declaration is not a treaty. Turning principles into a peace deal and eventually to a sustainable peace requires consistent long-term European involvement, writes Yalchin Mammadov in this-op-ed for commonspace.eu before facilitating trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU is first expected to address its own credibility gap with Baku. A more balanced approach—such as including Azerbaijan, alongside Armenia, in the European Peace Facility—could be a useful first step. Diplomats can negotiate peace; societies must build peace. In this context, the EU can do what it does the best: long-term societal engagement. By expanding youth and academic exchange programmes, investing in cross-border civil society initiatives, and fostering people-to-people cooperation, Brussels can help shape a new generation equipped to sustain peace beyond political cycles. Such tools are slow and unglamorous, but if ignored, even the strongest treaty risks collapse. And obviously, these aspects require two-way engagement and genuine willingness by both governments to facilitate contact. With Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia entering the enlargement track, and Belarus isolating itself, the Eastern Partnership model is becoming obsolete. Armenia has advanced through a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, while cooperation with Azerbaijan remains stuck under a minimally ambitious 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Negotiations on a modern agreement have stalled for years. If Brussels wants to remain influential, it needs to replace outdated one-size-fits-all policies with ambitious, interest-driven and differentiated approaches. Without a clear regional strategy, which appears to be the current situation, the South Caucasus will continue to sit at the margins of Europe’s security architecture—leaving space for other powers to take the lead.

Sudan’s latest war began in April 2023, though the seeds of its violence were planted long before. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces did not collide out of nowhere; they emerged from decades of political rot, unaddressed grievances, ethnic persecution, and military rule that carved deep fractures into the country’s social fabric. When fighting exploded across Khartoum and later consumed Darfur, Kordofan, and the east, it unleashed one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of the 21st century. In this op-ed, Ioana-Maria Ungureanu, Junior Research Assistant at LINKS Europe, takes a heartfelt look at the plight of Sudan, and its children. When the latest war started, whole cities emptied. Markets burned. Families fled on foot. And a famine began tightening its grip, slow and suffocating. And yet, the world remained mostly silent. Sudanese death is too often framed as an unfortunate feature of the region, a tragedy that feels expected rather than outrageous. Even when evidence of atrocity is abundant, it fails to command the same emotional weight. Sudan should not have to beg for visibility. It deserves it. Because its people deserve to live. And their lives deserve the same respect, safety, and hope that we demand for our own. (read the op-ed in full by clicking the image above)

To listen to world leaders speaking these days, one would think that the world has embraced multilateralism, as the guiding principle in international relations. From Brussels to Beijing the concept is lauded, often to distinguish countries or groups of countries from Trumpian America, which has turned multilateralism into a bogey, and often a punching bag. But a closer look indicates that many countries are talking at cross-purposes.  At one end you have the European Union, itself a quintessential multilateralist project grouping 27  member states, some of whom had spent the last century fighting each other. At the other extreme, there is China, a country with great ambitions, and a great discourse that accompanies these ambitions, who however presents itself as the self-proclaimed leader of the global south. Put simply, multilateralism is when a group of countries agree to pursue a common goal in cooperation, and based on equality. On the European continent, multilateralism was for fifty years the way the continent conducted business, and two organisations became a clear expression of this multilateralist path: the European Union (EU), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). They both operate by consensus. Beyond the continent, on a global level, the UN is in crisis. It will take a lot of time, effort, and money, to fix it. Three countries can help, or they can make matters worse: the US, Russia, and China. Trumpian America does not like the UN and has turned its back on multilateralism. The shameful US national security strategy creates a wedge between the US and Europe and sets a narrow vision of the world. Trump described the document as a "roadmap" to ensure the US remains "the greatest and most successful nation in human history". Russia is today in no position to counterbalance the US position, even if it wants to. So, its role in the future world order will be one of an opportunistic spoiler. China is another matter. It has the ambition to be a superpower and global player. It has good connections with the global south, although its claim of leadership is often overstated, and it pays lip service to multilateralism. It needs to be engaged, but with caution. Attempts at multilateral initiatives in the South, for example BRICS, are increasingly dysfunctional. Yet, multilateralism remains the best option for addressing the future. Some of the world's problems, such as climate change, simply cannot be tackled by one country, or one country working alone. But most of the institutions are greatly in need of an overhaul. The European Union must take the lead. It must also engage with China on a case-by-case, topic-by-topic basis. This will be a long and laborious process. But the rules of the game, and the assumptions that underpinned them, have changed, or at best are being challenged. It is time for a global rethink. (Click the image to read the full Monday Commentary).

In recent years, Eurasia has undergone a structural transformation in how regions connect, trade, and cooperate. The combination of geopolitical shocks, disrupted supply chains, and the search for secure east–west routes has elevated the importance of the Trans-Caspian space. The states of Central Asia, once constrained by geography, have taken unprecedented steps to strengthen regional coordination, modernize infrastructure, and integrate more closely with Europe. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has rapidly emerged as an indispensable connector linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and European markets. This new reality was formally acknowledged in November 2025 when Azerbaijan was unanimously welcomed as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State in Tashkent. What had long been a C5 grouping transformed into a C6, marking a historic moment: the Caspian was no longer a frontier separating two regions but the center of a unified geopolitical and geo-economic space. President Ilham Aliyev described this alignment as the emergence of “a single geopolitical and geo-economic region,” while President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called Azerbaijan’s inclusion “historic” and proposed transforming the consultative platform into a structured regional institution capable of shaping security, economic, environmental, and digital policy. The Caspian is no longer a boundary; it is the heart of an integrated region. The transformation of the EU and U.S. C5+1 formats into C6+1 is the logical next step to ensure that both sides of the Caspian advance together – coherently, strategically, and with shared purpose. (click the image to read the full op-ed).

The UN General Assembly, in a vote on Wednesday (3 December) overwhelmingly voted in favour of a resolution demanding that Russia returns Ukrainian children kidnapped since the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022. 91 countries voted in favour of the resolution, 12 voted against, and 57 countries abstained or were not present. Russia and Belarus were joined by ten countries in voting against the resolution, namely, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Eritrea. From the South Caucasus, Georgia voted in favour of the resolution, but Armenia and Azerbaijan abstained, as did Turkiye and the five Central Asian republics. Also abstaining were the six Gulf monarchies and most Arab countries. The resolution calls for the immediate return of Ukrainian children who were deported to Russia. The Ukrainian government says more than 19,000 children have been taken away from Russian-occupied areas and elsewhere since Moscow's invasion began in February of 2022. The draft resolution submitted on Wednesday demands that Russia "ensure the immediate, safe and unconditional return" of the children. (Read more by clicking the image)