Opinion: "Russia does not have the keys." Interview with Tom de Waal

Author and journalist Tom de Waal was recently in the South Caucasus for the launch of the Russian version of his book The Black Garden. Azerbaijani journalist Seymour Kazimov caught up with him in Tbilisi and asked him on his views on the Karabakh conflict and its resolution.

(Thomas de Waal is currently Senior Associate of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC).

 

 

 

May 2014 marked the 20th anniversary of the Ceasefire Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  A lot has been said about the losses of the two parties to the conflict.  It would be interesting to hear your perspective on the gains of the parties during those 20 years. 

 

There have been some gains, but only small ones.  It is enough to say that there has not been an outbreak of large scale conflict during the past 20 years. At the same time, we have seen small-scale skirmishes and people are still dying on the Line of Contact. As I mentioned, it might have been possible to attain progressive results in the absence of large scale clashes.

 

 

 

Russia and the West take opposite stands in almost all international conflicts.  It is only on the Karabakh issue that Russia and the West have a shared position.  What do you think? Does the status quo suit both parties' interests?  Why are Russia and the West so passive on precisely the Karabakh issue?

 

There are other issues on which Russia and the West have similar positions too.  Regarding the Karabakh issue, it is not as important as Afghanistan, Iran or the Middle East for Russia and the West.  However, it is more important than Sri Lanka or Congo.  Russia and the West are willing to solve the Karabakh issue but, at the same time, do not want to allocate too many resources to this end.  The parties themselves understand that the longstanding conflict needs to be resolved as well.  The current situation serves both Azerbaijan and Armenia.  They both believe that making compromises is too risky.

 

 

 

Azerbaijan has announced that it is not considering joining the Eurasian Economic Union.  However, it has not signed an Association Agreement with the EU.  What is official Baku wary of?  Is this related to the Karabakh issue?

 

In my opinion, the Azerbaijani elite thinks that it is pursuing a unique policy by keeping both Russia and the West at a distance and, of course, it does not want to create tensions in its relations with either side. It reminds me of the policy that Uzbekistan follows.  In terms of its relations with Russia, Uzbekistan is a step closer to Europe.  It is clear that Azerbaijan is hindered by European standards and transparency. At the same time, Russian intervention in Azerbaijan is undesirable for this elite. There is a great risk here.  Currently, Azerbaijan does not have strong and reliable partners.  After a while when the oil runs out, Azerbaijan will lose its strategic importance.  When this happens, Azerbaijan will ask itself: "Where are our allies?"

 

 

 

Armenia has stated its position that it will join the Customs Union.  Russia is seeking mechanisms for making Azerbaijan a member too. Do you think that "the key to resolution of the Karabakh issue still lies in the hands of Russia?"

 

The belief that the key to resolution is in the hands of Russia is unrealistic and an illusion.  This is the most convenient excuse for both the Azerbaijani and the Armenian elites.  They blame others for the lack of resolution, rather than admitting their own mistakes.  They hold others responsible.  Of course, Russia is one of the main actors among the foreign players.  But this does not mean that "Russia holds the key to the resolution of the conflict."  For instance, over the past 20 years neither conflict party has taken steps to resolve the conflict which Russia has blocked.  This has not taken place. 

 

 

 

People who are engaged in public diplomacy in Azerbaijan have recently been subject to pressures, including the arrest of Rauf Mirgadirov, a journalist...

 

Indeed.  First of all, let me say that this pressure is not only on people who are engaged in public diplomacy.  This is a general pressure against independent civil society representatives.  For instance, Anar Mammadli and others.  Rauf Mirgadirov's arrest might be related to his activities in Turkey, and his trip to Armenia was just an excuse.  Furthermore, pressures against Arif and Leyla Yunus could be related to other issues.  In any case, this is very alarming.  Because these are persons who openly express the importance of dialogue with the Armenians.  There are many others who share their views but seeing these kinds of pressures, they prefer to remain silent.  Without the participation of this segment of society, it is very difficult to reach a settlement with the Armenian side.

 

 

 

What can you say about the presidents' rhetoric on the Karabakh issue?  In one of your speeches, you described such rhetoric as active and passive aggression.  

 

It seems that the Azerbaijani rhetoric has been based more on enmity during the past 20 years. However, this cannot be said about the former president Heydar Aliyev.  He was more careful when talking about the Armenians.  Of course, in his speeches he called the Armenians aggressors.  But the current president and people around him are more aggressive on this issue.  This rhetoric is published and disseminated on the Armenian side as well and reduces confidence. Such speeches serveDashnaktsutyun.  This gives them the opportunity to spread the belief that "Azerbaijan is our enemy" in Armenian society. At the same time, the Armenian side argues that their rhetoric is not as harsh.  This is indeed the case.  However, I should note that it has a simple explanation, since Armenia is the winning side in the war that ended in 1994, despite its losses.  The party that has lost more in this war is Azerbaijan, mainly its territories.  When Armenia calls for peace and invites dialogue, but at the same time states that it will not return Fuzuli and Aghdam, I would call this passive aggression, rather than a call for peace.

 

 

 

You have worked on this conflict for a long time.  As a researcher, have there been any changes in your attitude towards the sources, development and consequences of this conflict?

 

In terms of sources, I can say that I have researched this aspect of the conflict quite well and described it in the first edition of my book ("Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War" - editor's note).  When the conflict started in the Soviet period, there was a naïve approach towards the developments.  It is not right to refer to conspiracy theories in this regard.  For instance, I do not believe that the "KGB" or Dashnaktsutyun had a "hand" in this.  This was a bomb which would have detonated sooner or later within the Soviet system.  The Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was a part of Soviet Azerbaijan and had relations with Soviet Armenia.  With the weakening of the Soviet authority, this bomb would have detonated.  Unfortunately, this was an inevitable process.  However, despite the situation 20 years ago, the conflict is now between two independent states.

 

 

 

So how is it possible to resolve this conflict?  How can the conflict be resolved in a way in which both Azerbaijan and Armenia are satisfied? 

 

First of all, this is a long-term process and it is not possible to resolve it within a short period of time.  Secondly, there is a peace plan based on 6 principles (the Madrid principles - editor's note).  These are the fundamentals.  The main problem is the lack of mutual trust.  There is also a need for a ceasefire in the rhetoric as a first step.  There needs to be mutual respect and real dialogue.  The meetings between presidents and foreign ministers every 3-4 months for 2 hours is nothing serious.  There is a need for a more structured process.  Within this framework, regular meetings should be conducted and parties should respect one another's positions.  As the process becomes more focussed, more foreign resources should be allocated for the resolution of the conflict. 

 

 

 

There is no mutual trust between ordinary citizens of the parties.  How can this be resolved? 

 

People are sensitive to the environment that the authorities have created.  If the authorities demonstrate a different course, the majority of people can change their views.  A lot of people are tired of this conflict and the parties are well aware that they will live together in the future.  If the situation changes, they will change as well. 

 

Are the events taking place in Ukraine and Caucasus similar in nature? 

 

The events taking place in Ukraine and Crimea have negative effects on the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Karabakh conflict. I am referring to the forceful resolution of the conflict and the redrawing of borders.  From another point of view, there is nothing new here.  There is simply one more conflict in the post-Soviet region now.

 

Do you think the events that took place in Abkhazia, the resignation of the "president" and the demonstrations, could be repeated in NagornyKarabakh? 

 

No.  People's democracy has been established in Abkhazia.  There are characteristics of the "mountain democracy" of the Caucasus here.  People get together, make decisions, and disperse.  This does not exist in Karabakh.  Authority here is exercised as a vertical function. 

 

 

 

Lastly, how long should we wait for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and "who" or "what" is preventing the resolution?

 

First of all, there is no need for waiting. Work needs to be done on a daily basis; stereotypes should be eliminated, dialogue pursued, etc.  It is not right to wait passively. Overall, I am very doubtful that these authorities are able to resolve the conflict. Maybe the new generation and new governments would be able to achieve resolution.  There is another factor at play too. The psychological element is a reality in the resolution of this conflict, in which the leadership in Azerbaijan and Armenia would realise that they need to work together, rather than against each other, for the sake of common interests and the resolution of the conflict.  Approaches that are based on the absolute victory of one side over another do not contribute to the resolution of the conflict.  

 


Seymur Kazimov interviewed Tom de Waal in Tbilisi in June 2014.

source: commonspace.eu.

photo: Tom de Waal (archive picture)

 

 

Latest

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).
Editor's choice
News
European Union and Canada agree on "Alliance for the future" at milestone Montreal summit

European Union and Canada agree on "Alliance for the future" at milestone Montreal summit

António Costa, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, represented the EU at the 21st EU-Canada summit, which took place in Montreal on 29 and 30 October 2026. Prime Minister Mark Carney represented Canada. The summit marked a major milestone in EU-Canada relations, paving the way for an even broader and deeper political partnership. Leaders took stock of progress made since the previous EU-Canada summit and issued a joint statement launching an Alliance for the Future. Building on their longstanding strategic partnership, the alliance aims to deepen cooperation and create a common prosperity and economic security space. This is a moment to act with clarity and ambition. By aligning more closely – economically, technologically and strategically – Canada and the EU are building an Alliance for the Future based on trust and shared values that meets the scale of today's challenges and opportunities and will reinforce the freedom, prosperity and safety our citizens expect and deserve. We are stronger together. Building on their existing Strategic Partnership Agreement, the EU and Canada will deepen political engagement and coordination on shared priorities. Leaders welcomed the increasingly frequent exchanges with Canadian ministers at relevant Council and ministerial meetings. The EU and Canada will build on these exchanges through regular summits, joint ministerial meetings and cooperation committees. The partners will work to define the concept of an ever-closer association of Canada to the EU, short of full membership, by the 2027 EU-Canada summit. (click image to read more)

Popular

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996,  Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe.  But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides.   Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan  saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)