Interview

OPINION: Andrey Ryabov: "Transference of the Karabakh conflict to the military stage is the main threat for Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus"

5 December 2011

What threats to the Russian interests in Armenia and Azerbaijan do you observe?

Undoubtedly, the main threat for Russia in the South Caucasus is defrosting of the Karabakh conflict and its transference to the military stage. The point is that today Russia is forced to combine close geo-political relations with Armenia and its energy interests, in which Azerbaijan plays a serious part like a transit and oil-producing country. Today these problems are becoming more and more relevant for Russia, taking into account the fact that Russia did not manage to make an arrangement with its Western partners on transit of energy resources via the South Caucasus. At the same time, the fact that during Dmitry Medvedev's presidency 6 trilateral meetings of the presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were held says that settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a priority for Moscow.

In this context, they in Russia believe that in conditions of neither peace nor mutual understanding in the region, the best choice for everyone is maintenance of the post-military status quo. After the war 08.08.08. there were too many concerns about Russia's becoming a revisionist super power changing the borders in the region. But Russia has no such idea acceptable to all the conflicting sides. Neither has it an opportunity to realize such ideas. In this context, Moscow made quite a reasonable decision to maintain the status-quo, I think. Today the relations between Russia and Georgia look more or less stable and have no pre-condition for changing of the situation established by the results of the war 08.08.08. For this reason, Russia is more anxious about resumption of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The fact that Azerbaijan is building up its military potential and forming its own not so big military and industrial complex is the main threat. In Russia they strictly understand that transference of the status-quo around the Karabakh conflict to the military conflict will have very hard and probably irreversible consequences for the Russian policy and its influence in the South Caucasus.

Let's talk about the reasons...

There is no doubt that in case of resumption of the Karabakh conflict Russia, as a partner, will lose its significance for both parties to the Karabakh conflict. This is the reason of such great efforts of Moscow and President Medvedev to preserve the status-quo, which President Putin will probably continue as well.

Do the OSCE MG other co-chair states really support Russia's efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict?

I have got an impression that over the last years the USA and Europe have realized that Russia also has exclusive possibilities to maintain peace in the region. Interaction between Russia, the USA and France in this context has been improved certainly. Nevertheless, I do not trust in the scenarios saying that Azerbaijan will get a permission to break the status-quo in the Karabakh conflict zone in exchange for provision of its territory for attacks on Iran. President Aliyev's rather shaky positions require, at least, more confidence and no mistake from him. In addition, resumption of war is so risky that it is within the interests of both the USA and France to maintain the status-quo. In this light, interaction with Russia has been enhanced over the last few years. Russia is allowed to display activity in maintenance of the status-quo. At the Summit in Astana in 2010 all the member-states and super powers "proved" their inability to resolve the Karabakh conflict. The status-quo is the best solution in the given situation. It cannot last forever, indeed, but it has no alternative.

So you don't share the opinion that in an attempt to gain leadership in the region Russia and the United States may play the Iranian card, do you?

I don't believe that the "controllable chaos" theory is possible now that the Arab spring has come. The situation in the Greater Middle East is getting increasingly uncertain, and this uncertainly has already covered one of the key countries of the region - Syria. Nobody can predict what will come of it, so, it will hardly be reasonable for anybody - whoever they are and whatever resources they have - to stake on the controllable chaos scenario. The economic crisis has limited the great powers' foreign policy capacities. So, I don't think that the US Government will take such a risk.

What logic do the "Arab revolutions" meet then?

Should there be a revolution in Syria, countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia (with their moderate Islam and tendency for modernization) may suggest that they may become better regional partners for the United States than Israel is now.

What about Libya?

While in Tunisia and Egypt everything was spontaneous, in Libya and now in Syria the West is playing a specific consistent game. Whatever it is, this game is dangerous and unpredictable, and the European Union has very limited power to keep it on the positive track.

Back on the Karabakh conflict. What probable scenario of the Karabakh conflict resolution can be predicted given the day-to-day realities?

I agree with the opinion of most analysts saying that there is a threat of resumption of the military phase of the Karabakh conflict. However, I think that the rational stance of super powers, including Russia, allows keeping the conflict frozen for rather a long period of time, even despite Baku's aspirations for changing the military balance with Armenia. The point is that another conflict in the Greater Middle East is pregnant with extremely grave aftermaths for a wide circle of countries, not just for the South Caucasus.

By David Stepanyan

1 December 2011 ArmInfo

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Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

19 October 2026

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).

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UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Role of Diplomacy during Active Hostilities

5 November 2026

The United Nations Security Council is today expected to adopt a presidential statement on the role of diplomacy during active hostilities. The draft text, which was authored by Pakistan, underscores the importance of maintaining diplomatic engagement even after the outbreak of armed conflict, with a view to containing escalation, facilitating cessations of hostilities and ceasefires, and creating conditions conducive to peaceful political settlements. Resolution 2788 of 22 July 2025, which was initiated by Pakistan, reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A year later, on 23 July, the Council convened an open debate to review the resolution’s implementation and examine ways of making more effective use of the peaceful dispute settlement tools available under Chapter VI. The draft presidential statement builds on previous Council products, such as resolution 2788, but it is the first to focus specifically on the role of diplomacy in containing and de-escalating active hostilities. Since the open debate in July, Council members have continued to call for intensified efforts towards de-escalation and dialogue, although differences persist over how proactively the Council should promote mediation and other peaceful means of dispute settlement, particularly in situations where the consent of the parties is contested. In his statement opening the general debate of the 81st session of the General Assembly on 22 September, Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted the devastating consequences of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Sudan, and the Middle East, warning that these and other crises illustrate what happens when “force outpaces diplomacy” and stressing the urgency of sustained diplomatic engagement. The negotiations on the draft presidential statement do not appear to have been particularly contentious, although Council members expressed differing views on some elements of the text. Pakistan circulated the initial draft to Council members on 14 October. Following informal consultations with Council members to address comments on the initial draft, Pakistan circulated a first revised draft on 23 October, incorporating several proposed amendments. On 29 October, Pakistan circulated a second revised draft, which it placed under silence procedure until the following day (30 October). After the US broke silence, a third revised draft was circulated on 3 November and placed under silence procedure until this morning (4 November). The draft subsequently passed silence. The agreed presidential statement emphasises the importance of maintaining direct and indirect channels of communication between parties to armed conflict to reduce the risk of miscalculation and create opportunities for sustained political engagement. (click image to read more)

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996, Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe. But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides. Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)

Dennis Sammut

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Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

21 September 2026

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)

Dennis Sammut

OPINION: Andrey Ryabov: "Transference of the Karabakh conflict to the military stage is the main threat for Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus"

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Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

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Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”