The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia was established shortly after the end of hostilities between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. It is a civilian unarmed mission, made up of monitors of the EU member states, with a mandate of 'stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building' along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) between Tbilisi administered territory (TAT) and South Ossetia in the north, and Abkhazia in the west. It is part of a new role assumed by the European Union after the 2008 war - the EU is also co-Chairman of the Geneva Process, and a European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia is also mandated to support the process of peaceful resolution of the yet unresolved conflicts.
Commonspace.eu special correspondent Joseph d'Urso met the Interim Head of the EUMM Mission, Gerard A. Fischer of Sweden at the Mission's headquarters in Tbilisi to find out more about the EUMM's work and the context in which it is operating in.
What is the EUMM trying to achieve
The main thing we are trying to achieve is ensuring the parties refrain from restarting the conflict. Basically, you could say we are a 'buffer' between potential groups that could restart a conflict. One part of this is by patrolling the administrative boundary line, finding out, discussing, observing and reporting thereafter.
Is EUMM value for money?
I think that, by and large, you could say that the money is fairly well spent; we haven't had many serious confrontations. Then again, we haven't contributed to bring about peace, but that's not really EUMM's mandate.
So what is the mandate?
It's a monitoring mission, and a monitoring mission is very specific. We are not permitted to do anything except monitoring - the mandate does not include any advisory function, no mentoring capacity. However, we attempt to follow not just the letter of the mandate but also the spirit.
In what ways do you work to make the situation in this region better?
One aspect, of course, is to feed the member states in Brussels with objective reporting of the situation on the ground. This allows them to decide EU policy vis-à-vis this region.
How do member states get this information?
EUMM prepares weekly reports, and of course we also from time to time go to brief policy makers. We brief the PSC (Political and Security Committee) ambassadors, and CIVCOM (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management). You could say CIVCOM is the working group of PSC - based on it, certain policies are concocted.
How has it all been going so far?
I think we have had a fairly good run because reporting is pretty good, pretty accurate. I think this is acknowledged by EU member states. They can compare us with other missions, though each mission is different in its complexity and characteristics.
What have been the main successes and failures of the mission?
I don't think much has gone wrong. If you have an executive mission you have a timetable and an activity, and this activity leads to an output that is concrete. In our case very little is concrete in terms of output. We go daily to various places at the administrative boundary line (ABL) and observe and report. As a result of our interaction, mainly with Georgians but also with IDPs from South Ossetia , we get a good hunch as to what is going on the other side of the ABL.
Is feedback from the locals themselves positive?
Yes, although people in a conflict area often want to see quick responses. I think very often, particularly at the beginning of the mission, we have been mistaken for a humanitarian or development agency. We always have these risks because even if you think you have made your mandate known to the population concerned , not everyone remembers and understands.
Villagers I spoke to in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp at Tserovani did not think highly of the EU. This is because they claim the vital humanitarian aid they were receiving stopped a year or so after the conflict.
The EU did, not EUMM. EUMM has a very specific mandate, as explained. I don't know exactly what the situation is now, but a shift has taken place since 2010 from humanitarian to development aid and assistance, which is of course a necessity. It is always difficult for us to understand the concept of being an IDP; but development has replaced humanitarian assistance based on the donor community's and the GEO government's decision
Do you think the mission would work better if it were armed?
Absolutely not. There have been requests for arming the mission, but as someone with experience from multi-lateral peacekeeping operations, I think that would be the worst thing. For us you can say the pen is the weapon, there is no need for arms. A few years ago there was a significant debate led by the Georgians about introducing third non-EU parties, particularly the Americans but also the Canadians, Japanese and Norwegians. I think we're lucky this didn't happen -the mission would get a completely different complexity.
EUMM only operates within TAT - the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities do not grant access. Do you think there is any prospect of this happening?
I've been around long enough in this business - possibilities always exist, but they are presently remote.
This must affect the EUMM's ability to do its work.
Of course. We work in a way to ensure we are unbiased in our reporting, but we don't have the full picture of what is goingon on the other side. We have to rely on secondary sources, such as people from (the IDP camp at) Tserovani, some of whom travel frequently across the Administrative Boundary Line.
What steps do you take to mitigate accusations of pro-Georgian bias?
We try to be objective in the execution of our mandate. Namely, for example, if somebody from the Georgian side does something against the agreements established, such as carrying the wrong type of weapons, we report this to the member states.
It seems Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are becoming more and more embedded, in direct contravention of the six-point ceasefire agreement agreed in August 2008. Do you see any way of this situation improving?
Perhaps after the Sochi Olympics [in February 2014].
How does Sochi affect things?
For security reasons, the Russian Federation border guard services are really trying to seal off and control everything that comes in from Abkhazia, from TAT to Abkhazia and further north.
Do you think the situation might improve after Sochi?
That's wishful thinking. When you've got a situation where something so prohibitive has been introduced, it is very difficult see that reverting to a softer system may occur easily.
So, there has to be a diplomatic solution?
All these conflicts need political expediency and political willingness in search for a solution. If you don't have that, we may be stuck here for many years to come.
So what does the EU propose as a solution to the stalemate?
The EU is very clear in its statements that we recognise Georgia within its international boundary, which includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I think at some point we have to wake up and discuss with the de facto governments without recognising them, engaging without recognising. That time has already come. You can't just put your head in the sand and say they don't exist. By not dealing with them, ABK and SO have no other option than endorsing the Russian solution.
I think we could alter that.
Joseph d'Urso interviewed the Interim Head of the EUMM Gerard A Fischer in Tbilisi on 31 July 2013.
Read also: EUMM: Unarmed but effective. A report by commonspace.eu correspondent Joseph d'Urso travelling with an EUMM a few days before the 5th anniversary of the Georgia-Russia War.
source: commonspace.eu
