Tehran has embarked on a “good neighbor” campaign: Dr Abbas Maleki

In this exclusive interview with commonspace.eu Dr Abbas Maleki, Director of the Institute for Caspian Studies in Tehran and Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and visiting scholar at Harvard University discusses the role of Iran in the Caucasus

 

 

 



Dr Maleki, How does Iran view the current situation in the Caucasus region?

The collapse of former Soviet Union in 1991 was the most important event in Iran's foreign policy from 1828. In 1828, Iran signed the Treaty of Turkmenchai with Tsarist Russia and lost most of the Caucasian region especially all of South Caucasus' terrotories. The seismic effects of Soviet disintegration had both opportunities and threats for Iran. By perceiving itself  as an Asian actor, instead of  only a Middle Eastern player  was    an opportunity  for  Iran  to create a new space for more cooperation with newly independent states in Caucasia and Central Asia.

A perpetual turbulent regional environment  to the northern part of Iran, specifically in North-West is one of major threats for Iran.

Iran's foreign policy of the past decade demonstrates Iran's pragmatism in the Caucasus.  It is not dictated by religious ideology but rather by Iran's national interests, both economic and political, and national security concerns. Iran's behavior in the Caucasus as a unitary actor in this regional subsystem of the international system is best viewed through a Neorealist paradigm, because of its strong explanation of Iran's behavior in the region, such as its open pursuit of national interests and protection of its national sovereignty.


In your opinion what contribution can Iran make to the Karabakh conflict
settlement process?

Since early and mid-1990s, Iran has been actively involved in crisis management of both inter-state as well as intra-state conflicts beyond its borders.

On the on-going Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iranian diplomats  in the past brokered several short term cease-fire agreements  

While tilting toward Armenia, Iran has been wary of any undue defeat of Azerbaijan; Tehran's warning and the dispatch of troops to the borders between Iran and Azerbaijan played a role in Zangalan, Fizoli, and Gebrail after the Armenians had occupied Nagorno-Karabakh.

Iran's security interest in these negotiations is clear; Armenia's border with Iran has more than doubled as a result of its military conquests of Azerbaijan's territories and, in light of Tehran's disputes with Azerbaijan over the division of Caspian Sea and the related concern over the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel nexus in the Caspian region, Iran's desire for a return to the status quo ante in the Caucasus is less than clear.

Iran also looks to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a court for Russian policy examination after cold war . For Iran, it is not assured that Russia  wants to solve NK crisis. Russia monitors former Soviet borders with NATO now along Armenian-Turkish lines.

Tehran has embarked on a "good neighbor" campaign designed to highlight its role as a potential catalyst for peace and prosperity in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Plans for a $120 million gas pipeline to Armenia, a longtime Iranian ally, have spearheaded this venture, but beneath the show of goodwill between Yerevan and Tehran, serious stumbling blocks remain.


Should the international community be talking to Iran more on the Karabakh conflict and the conflict settlement process?

Following the negotiations convened in Florida under the sponsorship of the "Minsk Group" of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in April 2001, the French head of Minsk Group visited Tehran and invited Iran to take part in the negotiations because "the role of Iran in preserving security and stability in the Caucasus region is clear." Also, according to Carey Cavanaugh, the U.S. mediator in the Karabakh negotiations at the time, Iran was regularly briefed on the peace process "to make clear to the Iranians that nothing in this peace process would infringe on their interests or be aimed against them."


Are Iranian think tanks ready for more engagement with their counterparts in the
Caucasus, Russia and the west on issues related to the future development of the Caucasus region?

Yes. There is  room for interactions  between the  Iranian elite and others in the region and outside. Iranian think tanks can interact with the institutes of political studies in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia for discussions on mutual interests of Iran and Caucasian states.Iranian research centers are also eager to exchange their views with Russian, Turkish, US, European and Chinese scholars to find solutions for regional crises in Caucasia.


(c) commonspace.eu

 

 

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