Global

This analysis was prepared for commonspace.eu by Anna Szedlacsek, Junior Research Assistant at LINKS Europe ================================================ The relationship between Russia and China has become one of the most consequential strategic partnerships in contemporary international politics. Often portrayed as an emerging anti-Western alliance, the two countries have significantly expanded their cooperation in the diplomatic, military, economic and technological spheres. Their partnership is united above all by a shared interest in reducing Western – particularly American – influence and promoting a more multipolar international order. However, describing the relationship as a fully-fledged alliance risks overstating both its cohesion and durability.  The modern partnership between Russia and China began in earnest following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Facing a new unipolar world dominated by the United States, both Moscow and Beijing realized that political alignment had become a strategic necessity to counterbalance American power. In 2001, the official framework for the modern partnership was solidified with the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation by Russian President Vladimir Putin and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin. This treaty formally ended decades of border tensions, established regular communication channels between their militaries, and laid the groundwork for closer diplomatic coordination.  The partnership took a new turn after Xi Jinping took office in late 2012 and Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency that same year. Driven by a shared goal of contesting U.S. global influence and preserving their respective authoritarian regimes, the two leaders dramatically deepened bureaucratic and military linkages.  Following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the resulting Western sanctions, Russia’s economy became heavily dependent on Beijing’s support. On February 4, 2022 – just before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – Russia-China reached their all time high when Putin and Xi met in Beijing to publicly declare a "no limits" partnership with "no forbidden areas of cooperation." Since the start of the war, Russia has overwhelmingly become the partner more dependent on the other. Faced with a new array of international sanctions, the Kremlin was forced to rely on China for goods on the G7 Common High Priority Items List, including semiconductors, integrated circuits, lithium-ion batteries, and computer numerical control (CNC) machines for metal shaping. Similarly, an analysis of recovered Russian weapons conducted by the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) showed that the bulk of Russia’s foreign components are actually Western-made, with China funneling these Western parts to Russia through parallel imports, shell firms in jurisdictions like Hong Kong, and domestic Chinese facilities manufacturing Western designs.  (to read the full analysis click the image)

The United Nations Security Council will discuss the situation in Georgia today (Wednesday, 20 August). The Council’s European members (E5)—Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, and the UK—requested the meeting to mark the 18th anniversary of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.  Several European members of the Council are expected to reaffirm their support for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. They are likely to condemn Russia’s actions during the 2008 conflict and its continued military presence in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and call on Russia to implement the 2008 ceasefire agreement. These members may also express opposition to steps that they regard as altering the status quo or leading to greater Russian integration with the two areas. In a 7 August statement marking the 18th anniversary of the conflict, the EU expressed concern about “increasing Russian attempts” to de facto integrate Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia into Russia’s regulatory and security space. The statement maintains that these measures, such as the “Agreement on Deepening Allied Cooperation” signed between Moscow and Tskhinvali on 9 May, and the appointment of a Russian official as “Acting President” of South Ossetia, have no validity under international law. European members may also raise human rights concerns—including with regard to restrictions on freedom of movement and other measures affecting conflict-affected communities—and call for unhindered access for international human rights and humanitarian actors. They are also expected to emphasise the need for renewed dialogue and may highlight the EU’s mediation role, including through its co-chairmanship of the GID and the work of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). In a 9 July statement following the latest GID round, the EU reiterated its support for the discussions and called for all participants, including Russia, to commit to the non-use of force and for the establishment of a verification mechanism. Other Council members are expected to emphasise dialogue and de-escalation, as well as the need to reach a peaceful settlement through existing diplomatic mechanisms. Such members may underscore the importance of confidence-building and the continued functioning of the GID. Russia is likely to reject European members’ characterisation of the 2008 conflict and reiterate its own account of the events. In an 8 August press release marking this year’s anniversary, the Russian Foreign Ministry maintained that Georgia initiated the hostilities against South Ossetia, defending Russia’s military response. Moscow is also likely to reiterate its call for legally binding commitments on the non-use of force between Tbilisi and the authorities in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, which it stated would provide a “robust guarantee against a recurrence” of the events of August 2008. (click image to read more)