The ongoing protests in Georgia, which erupted one month after the parliamentary elections and triggered by the Georgian Dream government’s announcement to suspend the EU accession process, are sending ripples across the entire South Caucasus, and regional countries fear it could snowball into wider instability. For Baku, a stable Georgia has always been central to its regional strategy, serving as a reliable partner and a critical gateway to international markets. Consequently, for the Azerbaijani leadership maintaining the status quo is critical to prevent chaos in a region that is already subject to strong volatility. At the same time, a Georgian government that would shift away from its Western partners may not necessarily be in Azerbaijan's long-term interest.
Georgia’s alignment with the West has long served as one of the cornerstones of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical strategy. Georgia’s pro-Western stance allows Azerbaijan to bypass Russian influence and maintain critical energy connections with Türkiye and Europe. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor wouldn’t exist without a stable and independent Georgia. But if Tbilisi begins to lean too heavily toward Russia, that could spell trouble for Azerbaijan. Moscow has always sought to keep its neighbours under its thumb, and an increasingly Kremlin-aligned Georgia could disrupt Azerbaijan’s access to the West.
For years, Azerbaijan has managed a delicate balancing act between Russia and the West, but it has always relied on Georgia in this effort. If Georgia becomes too close to the Kremlin, Azerbaijan might find itself with fewer options - and more pressure from Moscow to limit its Western partnerships. It is worth remembering that Russia’s ultimate goal in the South Caucasus has always been about control rather than stability. Conflicts, divisions, and dependencies have been the tools Moscow has used to maintain its influence over the region, and a Georgia closer to Moscow could become a lever for the Kremlin to undermine Azerbaijan’s interests, for instance by disrupting energy routes or other communications.
Complicating matters further is the weakening influence of the West in the region. Georgia’s relations with the EU have soured over issues like democratic backsliding and the foreign agent law, while Azerbaijan’s ties with the EU and the U.S. have also taken a hit. President Ilham Aliyev hasn’t shied away from voicing his frustrations. Speaking at COP29, he openly criticized France and the Netherlands for their neo-colonialist policies, and he’s been blunt in his remarks about Josep Borrell. Moreover, last year saw a sharp decline in the relations between the Biden administration and Azerbaijan, which last week has culminated in frank pronouncements by the social media account of the US Embassy in Baku. These tensions are a sign of a growing gap between the South Caucasus and the collective West, which creates more space for Russia to reassert its influence. This is happening at a time when Moscow is looking to regain its footing after setbacks caused by the invasion of Ukraine, as well as the latest developments in Syria. With Western influence on the retreat, the South Caucasus is expected to return to being a prime target for Russia’s power projection.
Georgia’s Azerbaijani minority
An often-overlooked but critical element in Georgia’s political landscape is its Azerbaijani minority, which makes up more than 6% of the country’s population. Predominantly concentrated in rural areas like Kvemo Kartli and regions such as Marneuli, these communities face systemic challenges. Many ethnic Azerbaijanis in Georgia do not speak the Georgian language, which creates barriers to political participation, education, and economic opportunities. Historically, the Azerbaijani minority has tended to support the ruling party, and the parliamentary elections in October 2024 were no exception. In Marneuli, for example, a region predominantly inhabited by Azerbaijanis, the Georgian Dream received a staggering 80% of the vote. However, this support has not come without controversy. Accusations of significant electoral fraud have surfaced, including allegations of ballot-stuffing at polling stations, one of which was caught on a video in Marneuli.
In addition to these systemic issues, Azerbaijanis in Georgia often face discrimination and vulnerability in their everyday lives. There have been instances where police or other officials reportedly made ethnic slurs against Azerbaijanis, raising concerns about their treatment by the government. For example, in a widely publicized incident, the Georgian police's alleged abuse of an ethnic Azerbaijani protester sparked outrage within the Azerbaijani community. More recently, unrest between communities arose when, following a car accident, the ambulance prioritized aiding the Georgians involved in the crash rather than the ethnic Azerbaijani teenager who passed away shortly afterwards.
For Azerbaijan, the situation of this minority is a double-edged sword. On one hand, the Azerbaijani community in Georgia represents a cultural and demographic bridge between the two nations. On the other, their marginalization and the controversies surrounding their political support risk exacerbating tensions both domestically in Georgia and between the two countries. Any instability affecting this minority could spill over into Azerbaijan’s broader relations with Georgia, complicating an already fragile regional dynamic.
What’s next?
For Azerbaijan, stability in Georgia isn’t just a nice-to-have; it’s critical for Azerbaijan’s economy, its energy exports, and its ability to maintain independence from Russian control. A Western-aligned Georgia provides a corridor to Europe, and losing that would force Azerbaijan to rethink its entire regional strategy. At the same time, Azerbaijan can’t ignore the broader implications of a weakened Western presence in the South Caucasus. Ultimately, the protests in Georgia are a reminder of just how fragile the South Caucasus really is. For Azerbaijan, the challenge is clear: support stability in Georgia while safeguarding its own independence and strategic interests. But with Russia eager to exploit any opening and the West’s influence fading, the road ahead is anything but straightforward. Much will also depend on the incoming Trump administration. Historically, Azerbaijan has found it easier to work with Republican administrations, which have often prioritized strategic partnerships over democratic conditionality. Georgian Dream also welcomed his re-election, probably hoping that pressure on democratic standards and human rights often will take a backseat. However, even under Trump, the structural decline in the US engagement in the region may not reverse.
