Opinion: Armenia's latest government reshuffle: what does it mean?

New Armenian prime minister Karen Karapetyan is putting the finishing touches to the composition of his new government. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu Sos Avetisyan says that the Ministerial changes have a limited scope, but other governmental appointments shed light on the long term power configuration.

Two months after the armed group "Daredevils of Sasun" seized and occupied the riot police headquarter in Erebuni, on the outskirts of Yerevan, a government reshuffle is under way. The armed group's desperate attempt raised the alarm to the dangerous level of social discontent in the country, and the need for change.

Karen Karapetyan, formerly member of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), but for the most part an outsider to Armenian politics was named as Armenia's Prime Minister. This appointment, just one year before the current semi-presidential Armenia gravitates towards a fully parliamentary model, serves dual tactical purposes for President Serzh Sargsyan. On the one hand, it is meant to ameliorate the drastic economic situation in the country, on the other hand to sooth the rise of anti-Russian sentiments.

At the same time, to a prudent observer it is clear that this change is only temporary, and is limited in its scope. Parallel to this shuffling, undercurrent strategic changes are taking place with some loyalists of former President Robert Kocharyan, the second president of post-Soviet independent Armenia, returning to positions of power. One should keep an eye on these changes as they shed light on more long-term power configurations in Armenia.

The brave new PM: the tactical configuration

The appointment of 53 years-old Gazprom high-profile executive Karen Karapetyan as Armenia's MP was no surprise. It is commonplace in Armenian politics to appoint an "outsider" as PM to deal with economic issues (Note 1). By the same token, in 2008 Tigran Sargsyan, who was previously head of the Central Bank of Armenia was appointed as technocratic PM.

Karen Karapetyan's candidacy as PM serves two main purposes. Firstly it is meant to remedy the anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia. The rise of these feelings after the brutal murder of an Armenian family in Gyumri by Russian soldier on January 12^th 2015, fueled by the "Electric Yerevan" rallies against price hike by Russian-owned (Russian Inter RAO UES Electric Networks of Armenia in 2006), reached their climax during the April "war" with Azerbaijan, when hundreds of activist started to protest Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan.

Karapetyan, whose previous involvement in Armenian politics was limited to being mayor of Yerevan (2010-2011), allows elbow room for Sargsyan to negotiate better deals with Russian companies that own strategic assets in Armenia. PM Karapetyan has already declared that there should be reconsideration of gas cost given the decrease in global price of this commodity. Furthermore, he suggested using differentiated matrix when charging for electricity, which will take into consideration the income level of the consumer. If these two projects are successful it will alleviate the situation of the impoverished Armenian population during the cold winter ahead. It will also earn important legitimacy points for the government that were depleted over recent years.

On the other hand Karapetyan is believed to be capable of changing the economic situation in the country, and attract investments. He was able to replace cabinet ministers responsible for economic aspects of governance, with his team of technocrats. At the same time there are some limitations to this change. Although ARF member Artsvik Minasyan, had to yield his position of Minster of Economy (the ministry was renamed Ministry of Economic Development and Investment) and take-up the Ministry of Ecology, he and two other minsters from ARF (Minster of Education and Science- Levon Mkrtchyan and Minster of Territorial Administration and Development- Davit Lokyan) retained their positions thanks to the protection provided by coalition agreement between RPA and ARF (note 2).

Furthermore the long serving Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense so far have retained their posts. Hence, there is a clear division of labour according to current political system of Armenia, where PM Karapetyan is tasked only to improve the economic performance, while the appointment and supervision of strategic ministries remains the sole prerogative of the president.

Enter Mr Second President: the strategic configuration

The phantom of Armenia's second President Robert Kocharyan has been haunting Armenian politics since Serzh Sargsyan assumed presidency in 2008. Rumors and speculations have it that the return of Robert Kocharyan to Armenian politics is inevitable. So far, there hasn't been any clear signal of such possibility.

After the Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP), said to be one of Kocharian's political projects, was publicly attacked by the government, the prospect of Kocharyan's return to politics diminished. Gagik Tsarukyan (believed to be loyal to Kocharyan) was banished from formal Armenia politics. However, the re-emergence of two long-time Kocharyan loyalists into the center of power politics rang alarm bells within political circles of Armenia. Armen Grigoryan and Alexan Harutyunyan were appointed as head of Armenia's National Security Council (NSC) and First Deputy Head of Presidential Administration respectively.

Gevorgyan was appointed Secretary of Armenia's National Security Council (NSC), on 6 June 2016. Before that he served as head of Kocharyan's administration (2006-2008) and concurrently was the Secretary of NSC. While formally the NSC doesn't yield real political leverages, it nevertheless is an influential body where leading statesmen meet regularly, a sort of politburo.

The other appointment of Alexan Harutyunyan added to speculations that some deal has been reached between Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. Harutyunyan before being appointed as deputy-head of presidential staff was Armenia's ambassador to Argentina and Chile. What is particularly noteworthy about this appointment is that Harutyunyan was a key suspect after the terror attack on Armenia's Parliament in 1999. Back then he was the head Kocharyan's staff and in 2003 he was appointed as the Chairman of Public TV and Radio broadcast. According to the Armenian opposition he was the mastermind behind the media restrictions before 2003 presidential elections.

These two appointments have strategic ramifications for Armenian politics. They stand as reminders of the lasting links between the second and third presidents of Armenia, despite the clear antagonism between two. It seems that with this configuration Sargsyan achieves an early political consensus for post-2018 Armenia.

Last but not least, the fate of the current head of presidential administration- Vigen Sargsyan is also crucial for understanding the future power configurations. Earlier in Armenian media outlets it was circulated that Vigen Sargsyan will replace Edward Nalbandyan as Foreign Minister. However, so far Naldbandyan remains foreign minister; the new speculation is that he will be appointed as Defense Minister. While Vigen Sargsyan does have some three years of experience working as an aide to the Defense Minster (2000-2003), this appointment will break away from Armenian tradition of appointing figures with either direct experience of the Karabakh war to head the defence ministry

Conclusions

It is perhaps too soon to draw definitive conclusions about the final make-up of the Armenian government, given the volatile political situation in the country and the complexities of transitioning from semi-presidential system to a parliamentary one. However, for now it seems clear that Prime Minister Karapetyan has received the green light to fix the economic situation. Since the weight of political-decision making will switch to the parliament in 2017 (note 3), this can only be considered to be a temporary adjustment.

Furthermore, the central question is whether Serzh Sargsyan will remain formally in politics. Although pledges were made by Sargsyan that he will not hold any significant office in future, given that he remains the head of RPA, which is likely to again emerge as the winner in the 2017 elections, such promise seems unrealistic.

Lastly, since independence successive Armenian regimes have developed an immunity to external drivers of democratization, and were able to resist the popular protests for change. The main mechanism through which they did so was the ability to reach elite consensuses. This time again by appointing Kocharyan's loyalist to important state positions, Sargsyan is demonstrating he remains on this path.

Source: Sos Avetisyan is an Armenian political commentator and observer. He recently graduated with an M.Phil in Russian studies from the University of Oxford. He contributed this op-ed for commonspace.eu

Photo: Armenia's second President Robert Kocharian greets Armenia's third president Serzh Sargsyan (archive picture)

Update.: This text was updated on 30 September 2016 to change formally to formerlyin paragraph 2

Notes

(1) In 1996 Armenia's ambassador to UK Armen Sargsyan and after that Robert Kocharyan were appointed prime ministers as power brokers, with no formal links to Armenian cartels

(2) On February 24, 2016 RPA and ARF signed a "Political Cooperation Agreement" which was meant to facilitate the implementation of constitutional reforms in Armenia. It also envisions a close cooperation in questions of national security and foreign policy. Some analysts viewed it as early coalition agreement ahead of Parliamentary Elections of 2017.

(3) For excellent overview see Kathleen Weinberger analysis for Regional Studies Center http://www.regional-studies.org/images/pr/2015/september/11/RSC_Staff_Analysis_Constitutional_Reform_Weinberger.pdf

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