Opinion: Armenia and Azerbaijan have embarked on a long and arduous journey towards sustainable peace.

In this Joint Policy Discussion Paper, Ahmad Alili and Benyamin Poghosyan welcome the start of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on a meaningful peace treaty. They warn however that, at all levels, trust between the two sides remains very low and that this will make the process difficult. They urge both sides to conduct the negotiations with a strong sense of realism, and to ensure that the speed of the negotiations is well calibrated.

On 31 August 2022, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, meeting in Brussels under the auspices of European Council president Charles Michel, agreed to authorise their foreign ministers to start immediate negotiations on a peace treaty. Instead, in less than two weeks, the two sides found themselves negotiating yet another ceasefire. 

Armenia and Azerbaijan are slowly emerging from a long period of conflict. Over three and a half decades, tens of thousands died in fighting; hundreds of thousands of people were displaced; tens of thousands of landmines and other unexploded ordnance contaminated huge tracts of territory, and war and enmity became the standard narrative with both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The 1st Karabakh War in the early 1990s resulted in massive loss of territory by Azerbaijan; the 2nd Karabakh War in autumn 2020 changed the reality on the ground for the second time, nearly, but not completely, restoring the status quo ante.

The political leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan have both declared their readiness to end the cycle of violence, negotiate on outstanding issues between them, and open a new era of peace – with peace being understood in its widest sense: not just the absence of war but also an active relationship for the mutual benefit of both nations, and of the wider region.

Even after the 13-14 September violence, the two sides reiterated their commitment to negotiate and sign a peace treaty. Senior officials from both sides met in the second half of September in an effort to sustain the momentum of the negotiations, and, on Sunday 2 October, the foreign ministers of the two countries finally set the process of formal negotiations in motion. But the level of trust between the two sides remains low, and in the last weeks, may have become even lower. Despite the fog of warfare and of disinformation campaigns, however, some conclusions can still be reached that can help map out the next steps:

  • The decision to negotiate intensively and face-to-face is a very good one.

It is right that the leadership of the two countries have decided to negotiate face-to-face. There are currently two tracks of negotiations, one facilitated by Moscow, and one by Brussels. France and the United States are also contributing to the process. At a time of intense geopolitical competition, with a war raging in Ukraine, maintaining these tracks in complementarity has not been easy, but the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships have so far succeeded in doing so, and multiple tracks have given both countries some room for manoeuvre, which is necessary.

  • The approach not to artificially prolong the negotiations is correct. 

The long, protracted, and apparently fruitless negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries from the early 1990s to 2020 haunt the current peace negotiations. Neither country can afford the uncertainty that stems from a simple extension of the current situation, with the risk that it may, by intention or by accident, result in another large-scale war. So protracted negotiations are not the best option, and the decision to move forward promptly with negotiating a peace agreement is logical, even though it brings with it some risks for both sides.

  • Lack of trust between the sides and a continued poisoned atmosphere in the space of public debate is a real obstacle to peace that needs to be fully recognised.

Regardless of the political will, the context in which a peace treaty has started being negotiated is very difficult. At every level of Armenian and Azerbaijani society, there is a lack of trust. The debate in the public space on both sides remains mostly adversarial and polarised. The debate on social media is toxic, fed with disinformation, puerile propaganda and flawed analysis. Yet those engaged in these practices are often well-intentioned, and they need to be engaged rather than demonised.

This situation cannot be ignored and needs to be addressed. It will take time, which is why a peace treaty needs to be seen as the start of a journey, and not the end.

  • Clashes on the border constitute a huge risk of not only derailing the peace process but also of triggering a new full-scale war.

The clashes on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan seriously risk derailing the peace process. If these clashes are being provoked intentionally, if they escalate quickly because of misperception, or if they result from unintentional incidents caused by a fluid situation on the ground, they need to be quickly evaluated. This requires increased transparency that can be provided with the help of satellite imagery, electronic monitoring or physical monitoring by third parties acceptable to both sides. There also need to be spaces and safe channels of communication between the two sides at an operational level where incidents can be discussed if they happen and, if possible, prevented from happening at all.

An early peace treaty is necessary but will never solve all the issues. Both sides need to approach the negotiations of a peace treaty with a strong sense of realism.

A peace treaty needs to be based on mutual respect. Negotiating it has to be based on a sense of realism, including the cost of failure and the risk that an unsustainable agreement can pose to a lasting peace.

A peace treaty needs to be defining: it must signify a clear break between the past cycle of violence and a future era of peace; it must be comprehensive enough to avoid future ambiguity; it must be of mutual benefit so that both sides can become convinced stakeholders in its upholding and in the delivery of its provisions.

However, a peace treaty does not need to be complete simply because, in the present context, it cannot be. There are issues on which negotiations will have to continue and need more time to be worked out, regardless of the wider political framework that can be agreed upon in a peace treaty. But a peace document containing the main principles on which peace will be established would still be a major step forward.

The peace treaty should have its godparents within the international community.

International engagement with issues related to Armenia-Azerbaijan relations has evolved very quickly over the last two years. Whilst Russia, and particularly president Vladimir Putin, were pivotal in negotiating an end to the 44-day Karabakh War and the signing of the 10 November 2020 trilateral declaration, the European Union, and particularly European Council president Charles Michel have in the last year been instrumental in taking the peace process forward. France and the United States have in recent weeks also been active in supporting the latter process.

It is correct that Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiate the peace treaty without intermediaries. In the end, it is their will that matters.

However, it is also appropriate, and necessary, that once an agreement has been reached, the international community can provide godparents for supporting its implementation. This support will first and foremost have to be financial. A good economic project that can give mutual benefit to thousands from across the two communities is worth a thousand peacekeepers, and many such projects will be necessary. 

Some international presence on the ground may be necessary too for a longer period. In November 2020, based on the trilateral declaration signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the Karabakh conflict zone. A new situation will require a new response, including the transformation of the peacekeeping operation. The speed and format of this transition will depend on many factors, and the change may evolve over a period of time.

France, Russia and the United States, for nearly three decades, were mandated as co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Process to work towards a settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Their successes and failures have been much debated. In any case, now Azerbaijan no longer recognises this mandate. It falls on the three countries themselves and the OSCE that gave them their mandate in the first place to take the initiative on defining how the international community wants to engage with Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and the wider region in the future. Whilst this will not be easy given the current impasse in the international situation, this work must now start. The new role of the EU will also need to be recognised.

Building trust and confidence, expanding prosperity

A peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan will be a major breakthrough in the relations between the two countries and the two nations. However, it will remain a piece of paper, and may even become a new source of tension, unless it is accompanied, and quickly followed by a process to build trust and confidence between institutions, people and communities. This task is massive and has hardly started. The Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group of experts working on confidence-building measures in support of lasting peace in the South Caucasus (JOLIG), of which we are co-rapporteurs, in April published its report “The South Caucasus from war to peace: thirty measures between now and 2030”. This report outlines tangible actions that need to be taken in the short, medium and long term. Whilst the report has been widely welcomed, efforts for its implementation have been sluggish. This work now needs to start in earnest.

An Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty stands zero chance of success, regardless of the goodwill of the political leadership, unless trust and confidence between the people at all levels is restored.

This can partly be achieved through building economic ties, both at the macro and the micro level, that must pay tangible dividends. Whilst some of this will take some time since it will depend on developing infrastructure, availability of large amounts of funds, and on wider developments, there is a need for “early wins” for the population on both sides. Whilst not everyone is convinced that an “economics first” approach may necessarily be the best approach, everyone agrees that economics cannot come last.

In this regard, proper use needs to be made of what has already been achieved in bilateral practical economic measures of cooperation between Armenia and Georgia, and Azerbaijan and Georgia. There are plenty of opportunities for these bilateral formats to become trilateral formats.

Overall, a process of building balanced, mutually beneficial, economic linkages will help give all sides a vested interest in peace.

Embedding Armenia-Azerbaijan peace in a wider regional context

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace can best be sustained by embedding it in a wider regional context. First and foremost, this should bring Georgia into a series of trilateral regional arrangements that are long overdue and that have strong potential.

Beyond that, the involvement of other nearby countries, including Russia, Iran and Turkey, and beyond the countries of the Black Sea, Central Asia and the Gulf will unleash the potential of the Caucasus Region as the interconnector between east and west, and north and south.

A regional security platform that will include regional and international players, including the US and EU, can be launched at the right time and, in the meantime, should be conceptually discussed by think tanks and academic circles.

The long and arduous journey ahead

Armenia and Azerbaijan have embarked on a long journey towards sustainable peace: it will be arduous, but it is necessary. The journey must neither be done too fast, nor too slow. In fact, calibrating the speed of this journey is going to be the immediate next challenge.

This is a joint Policy Discussion Paper prepared by Ahmad Alili, Director of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre in Baku, Azerbaijan, and Benyamin Poghosyan, Director of the Centre for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, Armenia. Both authors are co-rapporteurs of the Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group on confidence-building measures in support of lasting peace in the South Caucasus (JOLIG), an initiative facilitated by LINKS Europe with the support of the European Union.

For more information on the work of the Joint Liaison Group please contact the Secretariat at office@links-europe.eu

Latest

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).
Editor's choice
News
UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Role of Diplomacy during Active Hostilities

UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Role of Diplomacy during Active Hostilities

The United Nations Security Council is today expected to adopt a presidential statement on the role of diplomacy during active hostilities. The draft text, which was authored by Pakistan, underscores the importance of maintaining diplomatic engagement even after the outbreak of armed conflict, with a view to containing escalation, facilitating cessations of hostilities and ceasefires, and creating conditions conducive to peaceful political settlements. Resolution 2788 of 22 July 2025, which was initiated by Pakistan, reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A year later, on 23 July, the Council convened an open debate to review the resolution’s implementation and examine ways of making more effective use of the peaceful dispute settlement tools available under Chapter VI.   The draft presidential statement builds on previous Council products, such as resolution 2788, but it is the first to focus specifically on the role of diplomacy in containing and de-escalating active hostilities. Since the open debate in July, Council members have continued to call for intensified efforts towards de-escalation and dialogue, although differences persist over how proactively the Council should promote mediation and other peaceful means of dispute settlement, particularly in situations where the consent of the parties is contested. In his statement opening the general debate of the 81st session of the General Assembly on 22 September, Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted the devastating consequences of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Sudan, and the Middle East, warning that these and other crises illustrate what happens when “force outpaces diplomacy” and stressing the urgency of sustained diplomatic engagement. The negotiations on the draft presidential statement do not appear to have been particularly contentious, although Council members expressed differing views on some elements of the text. Pakistan circulated the initial draft to Council members on 14 October. Following informal consultations with Council members to address comments on the initial draft, Pakistan circulated a first revised draft on 23 October, incorporating several proposed amendments. On 29 October, Pakistan circulated a second revised draft, which it placed under silence procedure until the following day (30 October). After the US broke silence, a third revised draft was circulated on 3 November and placed under silence procedure until this morning (4 November). The draft subsequently passed silence. The agreed presidential statement emphasises the importance of maintaining direct and indirect channels of communication between parties to armed conflict to reduce the risk of miscalculation and create opportunities for sustained political engagement. (click image to read more)

Popular

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996,  Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe.  But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides.   Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan  saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)