20 years ago, on 21 September 1991, Armenia held a referendum on self-determination and status of the republic. 94,99% of voters participated in voting, with 99% of votes cast in favour of Armenia leaving the Soviet Union. Two days later, based on the results of the voting, a Declaration of State Independence of Armenia was adopted. Thus, a new nation state was born in the South Caucasus.
The process of transforming the former Armenian SSR into an independent state differed essentially from similar situations in the neighboring republics (Georgia and Azerbaijan), as well as in other formations of the once united Soviet Union. It began not as much because of a conflict between the central authorities and a national movement in the republic, but rather because of a formally external reason. This is, of course, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast, which was subject to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijani SSR. Protests of Karabakh Armenians catalyzed ethno-political mobilization in Armenia. The first President of independent Armenia, just like the members of his first team, went through the “school” of the Karabakh committee and its experience of confrontation with the central authorities of the Soviet Union. The second and third Presidents of Armenia used to be the most active participants and leaders of the movement of Karabakh Armenians. The Karabakh issue by large predetermined independent Armenia’s agenda. The republic managed to overcome the political and psychological problems of the beginning of the XX century. A military victory for the land, which Armenian national elite would consider its own, was achieved. But this success also predetermined Armenia’s current regional insularity (two of its four borders remain closed), its economic detachment from its neighbors and its critical dependence on Russia.
On 21 September 2011, to honor the anniversary of national independence, a military parade was held in Yerevan, where troops of 102nd military base in Gyumri took part, as well as border-guards, who secure protection of the external perimeter of republic’s border jointly with Armenian colleagues. Officials and numerous experts welcomed this, speaking of Russia as a reliable guarantor and ally. Today Armenia is by default considered Russia’s key ally in the Caucasus, its outpost.
Indeed, the dynamics of bilateral relations today (especially against the background of Russia’s relations with other CIS countries) is impressive. Over 1,000 Russian enterprises operate in Armenia. Russian business is present in strategically important areas, such as railway and energy. Over 70 Russian oblasts and republics cooperate with Armenia. Trade turnover is increasing. Armenia is a member of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which they like to call “the post-Soviet NATO” in Moscow, and participant in EurAsEc.
However, to disregard the problematic points existing in relations between Moscow and Yerevan, would oversimplify things. On the eve of Independence Day a vote was held on the Facebook social network to identify the attitude of residents of Armenia to the participation of Russian troops and border-guards in the military parade. 1,250 people voted, of whom only 147 assessed this positively. By comparison, 485 said this is “highly negative”, and 437 – “normal”. So what is the problem, shrouded by buoyant rhetoric by both sides?
In the first place, Moscow is not very happy over Yerevan’s position on Georgia. The Russian leadership counted on Armenia’s ability to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And it is possible that it will hold an even harder stance on the situation in Javakheti (Armenian-populated region in Georgia). In the meantime, relations between Tbilisi and Yerevan in the period of 2008-2011 demonstrate signs of improvement, and not of deterioration. Leaders of both countries visited each other. Those visits were accompanied by awards and words about Armenian-Georgian friendship. Russian authorities are also irritated about Armenia’s partnership with NATO, which did not stop in 2008. On the contrary, Yerevan tries to maintain an acceptable level of relations with the North-Atlantic alliance.
Secondly, Yerevan has certain dissatisfaction (or lack of understanding) with regard to some Russian actions. At least, there is lack of understanding of Moscow’s reasons. This relates to issues like development of Russian-Azerbaijani partnership (including military) and Russian-Turkish relations (which were recently named “strategic” in Ankara). It would probably be fair to reproach the Armenian society for irrational attitude to Turkey and possible Russian-Turkish agreements. But any politician, who works in the Caucasus and in Eurasia in general, should consider the factor of asymmetry of perception. What is seen as a necessary part of foreign policy PR in Moscow, in Yerevan (simply because of its complex geographical and geopolitical disposition) is seen as a serious challenge. As for the Armenian opposition, it is seriously worried over the huge activity of Russian business in Armenia, not particularly about the activity itself, but rather over the lack of transparency around important deals and agreements.
All these phobias and discontents did not come up over the last year or two.. But it is not possible to ignore the fact that the five-day war of 2008 strengthened them. Fears stirred up regarding possible exchange of Karabakh to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
From our point of view, the key problem in the development of bilateral Russian-Armenian relations is the disproportion in perception of each-other’s policy. For Yerevan, the Moscow’s hyper-ball role in the post-Soviet area is peculiar. This is where discussion of possible Russian concessions on Karabakh stems from despite the fact that it is obvious that one can only concede something it has possession of. Russia’s influence on NKR is not as high (and in fact hardly comparable at all) with its influence on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. NKR in turn traditionally distanced itself from the so-called alliance CIS-2, preferring to view itself in the same context as Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, highlighting the interconnection of its problem with the European cases of ethnic self-determination and cutting itself from Eurasian (post-Soviet) topics. Therefore, it hardly makes practical sense to overestimate Moscow’s hand in Karabakh. The year of 1988 has long gone., The Kremlin’s interests in this region have pragmatic basis. And this basis hardly trespasses the limits of the status-quo, which found its concrete expression in the Moscow Declaration of 2 November 2008 and in the subsequent (Russian) mediation work on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
For Russia, which plays not only regional geopolitical games, but also “a Great Game” with the West (at least, attempts are made to present the current events in this fashion), problems in relations with its strategic ally are underestimated. Here confidence in the Soviet momentum, which allows Moscow to preserve its leading role without any predicament, plays its role. Besides, there is a belief that all the merits (in this case without any irony, this is about real merits of Russia, including development of mobile network, railroad and security guarantees) automatically entitles the big state to somehow disregard the opinion of its smaller strategic ally. In truth, Russia would have lost nothing, if it had held public consultations with its allies, including Armenia, regarding its actions in South Ossetia, not in September CSTO summit in Moscow, but during the hot August? Most likely, the Kremlin would not have been unanimously supported in everything, but some choice of words, satisfying the Kremlin, would have been found. With that an impression of a working partnership would have been created, which would not consider only the Metropolitan view. . The same goes to Russia’s business domination in Armenia. There is no doubt that Russian business brings in investment into the country, incomparable with investment flow from other countries. But lack of transparency around the activity of Russian companies, the under-hand nature of those deals, on which some light could have been shed, (particularly if they touch strategically important sectors of economy), cause problems. Relations between allies also require a radically different approach to the Armenian community in Russia. And here we are coming back to the problem of asymmetry of perception. For big Russia expressions of this or that politician or a journalist (and equally xenophobic publications and statements in media) do not play the role they do for small Armenia, where they are being exaggerated and are viewed highly emotionally.
In the conditions of forming a new status-quo in the Greater Caucasus both Moscow and Yerevan should exercise more realism in assessment of each others’ motives, desist from inflated expectations in order to avoid tantalizing frustrations in the future. Today one has to admit that as a matter of fact, Moscow does not recognize the independence of NKR, nor does Yerevan recognize that of the two former Georgian autonomies. The Kremlin will not reject cooperation with Baku, and will not make an ultimate choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Yerevan also will not refuse cooperating with the West, nor with Georgia, via whose territory two-thirds of Armenia’s foreign trade is conducted. And after all, you do not choose your geographical location.. In the current state of land blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan for Armenia Georgia and Iran are the only windows to the world. In this respect the US approach is significant, as they in fact close their eyes on Armenia’s cooperation with Iran.
Consequently, the super task for diplomats of both countries could be to shed light during complicated moments, rejecting mutual phobias, fears, suspicions and uncertainties.
Sergei Markedonov has a Doctorate in History and is currently Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, USA. He is a regular blogger on commonspace.eu Russian edition.
