"Despite hopes, Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023", writes Benyamin Poghosyan in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. "However, since the text of the document seems to be, by and large, already agreed, there are hopes that an agreement may be signed in the first half of 2024. Otherwise, the EU and US election cycles in the Summer and Autumn of 2024 may push the South Caucasus out of the West's radar. If this happens, Russia may resume its leading role as a negotiation platform between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pushing the two sides to sign a peace agreement in Moscow by the end of 2024", he argues.
2023 started with mixed feelings in Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations. It seemed that the October 2022 Prague statement, where the Armenian government recognized Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, paved the way for the signature of an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Many perceived the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the fate of the Armenian population as the primary obstacle to the peace process. Meanwhile, the blockade of the Lachin corridor, imposed by Azerbaijan in mid–December 2022, added tensions in bilateral relations.
The negotiation process resumed in February 2023, as Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, a summit facilitated by the US Secretary of State. This meeting opened the way for months of intensive negotiations. The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met twice in Washington in May and June 2023 to discuss a peace agreement, while Pashinyan and Aliyev met twice in Brussels in May and July 2023. In the meantime, the two leaders also met in Chisinau on June 1, 2023, on the margins of the second European Political Community summit, accompanied by the President of the European Council, the President of France, and the German Chancellor. The sides registered significant progress in elaborating the peace agreement, claiming that at least 70 percent of the text was agreed.
On the other hand, the continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade impacted the process negatively. On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan established a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, and since mid-June, banned all transportation in and out of the region, with rare exceptions of medical evacuations done by the International Red Cross. Azerbaijan pushed for the usage of the Aghdam road to supply Nagorno Karabakh, while Armenians rejected this option, fearing that it would be another step towards "reintegration into Azerbaijan." Armenia applied to the International Court of Justice, but Azerbaijan de facto refused to implement the court's decision. Upon Armenia's request, the UN Security Council discussed the situation on August 16, but the gathering ended without any statements or resolutions.
Despite the ongoing tensions around the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, negotiations on the peace agreement continued, and on September 11, Azerbaijan provided its latest version of the text to Armenia. However, Azerbaijan decided to use force to "close the Karabakh chapter" and launched a large-scale military offensive on September 19. Armenian government decided not to intervene militarily, and Russian peacekeepers took the same approach. Without any external support, the authorities of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic were forced to capitulate and sign a decree on the dissolution of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by the end of 2023. Within ten days, all Armenians left Nagorno-Narabakh, and on October 15, President Aliyev reviewed a military parade in Stepanakert with practically no Armenians remaining in the town.
Some hoped that the "destruction of Nagorno Karabakh" would facilitate the peace process. The EU put significant hope on the scheduled Granada meeting between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan on the margins of the third European Political Community summit. The Secretary of the Armenian Security Council and Foreign policy advisor to President Aliyev met in Brussels on September 26, and everything indicated the sides were ready to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023. Then, suddenly, Azerbaijan pulled away from negotiations. President Aliyev canceled his visit to Granada, citing France's decision to sell weapons to Armenia and the discussions at the European Parliament about Nagorno-Karabakh as the main reasons. Arguably, he demanded participation at the Granada meeting of President Erdogan, an offer rejected by France and Germany. Then President Aliyev rejected the EU offer to hold a leaders' summit in Brussels by the end of October 2023 in the "original Brussels format" and also canceled the meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers scheduled for November 20, citing the anti-Azerbaijan statements by the US State Department officials during November 15 hearings in the US Congress. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan hinted at its readiness to resume negotiations in Moscow, within the 3+2 platform, or at the bilateral level. On November 30, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Commission on delimitation and demarcation met on the Armenia – Azerbaijan border and agreed on its charter. On December 7, 2023, Armenia and Azerbaijan made a significant step forward by adopting a bilateral statement on pushing forward the peace process, exchange of POWs, and also Armenia's support to Azerbaijan to host the COP 29 conference in Baku in 2024.
Meanwhile, the US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, James O'Brien, visited Baku and met with Azerbaijani President Aliyev on December 6. According to different sources, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to hold a foreign ministers meeting in January 2024 in Washington, while bilateral negotiations will probably continue. On February 7, 2024, Azerbaijan will hold snap Presidential elections, and a landslide victory of President Aliyev seems assured.
Thus, despite hopes, Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023. However, since the text of the document seems to be, by and large, already agreed, there are hopes that an agreement may be signed in the first half of 2024. Otherwise, the EU and US election cycles in the Summer and Autumn of 2024 may push the South Caucasus out of the West's radar. If this happens, Russia may resume its leading role as a negotiation platform between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pushing the two sides to sign a peace agreement in Moscow by the end of 2024.