With the emergence of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbours” policy Turkey has become one of the most dynamic states in Eurasia, reasserting itself in its neighbourhood by pursuing a proactive policy of strategic engagement aimed at defending and satisfying the strategic interests of the country.
Turkey has already achieved considerable success in its Middle East/North African neighbourhood and in the Western Balkans where it has used its unique identity to pave the way to foster better political and economic ties. Turkey is also trying to get a stronger foothold in the South Caucasus. Ankara understands that the region is of strategic importance and has sought to diversify and upgrade its influence. However, despite the fact the region is geographically in Turkey’s direct neighbourhood, its efforts to deepen its engagement have not achieved the desired result and Turkey has, to a certain extent added to regional tensions rather than help diminish them. Because of the complex relations between the countries themselves, their large neighbours, and Turkey’s own and very different relationships with each of the three states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia),Russia and Iran, Turkey as failed to develop the type of special role it has managed to carve out for itself elsewhere.
Ankara’s re-emergence and foreign policy shift toward the South Caucasus came principally in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia War which shattered the political status quo in the region. With concerns over stability (including Turkey’s aims to be an energy bridge between the Caspian and Europe), and fear that the US was losing interest in the region, Ankara launched two initiatives which it hoped would bring about greater regional stability as well as allow it to play a larger role in regional conflicts such as that between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The first was the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”; the second a process of rapprochement with Armenia with which Turkey has had a closed border and no diplomatic ties since 1993. Both initiatives also came at a time when Ankara’s relations with Russia were witnessing a dramatic improvement (something that Turkey believed would facilitate success). Given Russia remains the real power broker in the region, any efforts to alter the geostrategic status quo need Moscow’s blessing. Thereby, Turkey’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus will very much be shaped through Ankara’s relations with Russia and to a lesser extent the EU as it takes on a great role there.
Unfortunately Ankara miscalculated and neither initiative bore fruit. In particular, the failed rapprochement only served to increase regional tensions and undermine international efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict
Turkey underestimated the reaction of its “kin”, Azerbaijan to rapprochement with Yervevan and the ability of the Armenian diaspora to pressure Armenia’s leadership. Turkey’s decision to link rapprochement with progress on Karabakh was destined to bring it to a halt in early 2010 because Ankara over-estimated Russia’s readiness to “cajole” Armenia into concessions. Ankara’s credibility was damaged, its relations with Azerbaijan took a step backwards and in Armenia there was a significant increase in mistrust towards Turkey with Yerevan going on to further increase security ties with Moscow. Moreover, it resulted in a stalling of the Karabakh peace talks and increased ceasefire violations.
The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform aimed at building confidence among the countries, by creating a forum for dialogue between the three countries, Turkey and Russia. Launched without much thought it had very little (if any) meat on the bones, received very little enthusiasm from most of those invited to join and excluded important international actors such as the EU and US. Therefore it never really got off the starting block.
While Turkey may have up-graded relations with both Georgia and Azerbaijan, its failure to mend fences with Armenia mean that in a broader regional sense Turkey’s initiatives have only resulted in a more complicated regional situation. For Turkey to have a real role in the region Ankara first needs to concentrate on implementing “zero problems” within regional countries. Proposals to create stability pacts and platforms can only be implemented in the event of a normalization of bilateral relations between the three regional states and Russia and if Turkey’s relations with each develops in a consistent manner which is presently not the case.
Furthermore, while Turkey continues to build-up its strategic relationship with Azerbaijan, to be a credible regional player it needs to find a way of getting its rapprochement with Armenia back on track without making any linkage to Nagorno-Karabakh given that it has been duly recognised that Ankara has no role to play in the solution of this conflict. Turkey cannot be an honest broker, because it supports Azerbaijan’s arguments. The most Turkey can do is to try to play an instrumental role in encouraging Russia, who it set to remain the key player in the region for sometime to come, to work harder for a lasting solution.
Amanda Paul is an analyst at the European Policy Centre in Brussels. (a.paul@epc.eu). She contributed this op-ed to commonspace.eu
