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This article is part of the "Armenia Season", featuring on commonspace.eu from 1 May -15 June 2026.
It was first published on Armenia Elections Monitor - a LINKS Europe initiative - on 1 May 2026
Alex Vergé is a freelance writer and political analyst, specialising in geopolitics and international relations. He is currently based in Yerevan from where he filed this report.
When Armenians vote in parliamentary elections on 7 June, it will have been almost ten years since elections were last held on schedule. In the decade since the last regular parliamentary elections in 2017, the country has experienced a period of significant political upheaval and conflict. The 2018 Velvet Revolution forced out an entrenched political elite and set the country on a path of institutional and political reform. The conflict with Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in turn came to a decisive end, with Armenia suffering military defeat in 2020 and an Azerbaijani offensive in 2023 leading to the displacement of almost all of the local Armenian population - approximately 100,000 people - and the end of the Republic of Artsakh as a breakaway state.
The key national political figure over the course of this decade has been the current Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who is seeking re-election as the leader of the Civil Contract party. Then, a leading figure of the opposition, Pashinyan, first came to power during the 2018 revolution. He subsequently won snap elections in 2018 and 2021, with the latter held in response to the 2020 War and the last election in Armenia to date.
Geopolitical realignment and peace in the South Caucasus
While the early years of the Pashinyan premiership were focused on democratic and institutional reforms, foreign and security policy have come to dominate the national agenda. Two major policy choices have defined the approach of the current administration and will effectively be on the ballot come 7 June, with potentially crucial geopolitical repercussions.
First, a policy of balancing and diversification aimed at reducing reliance on Russia, Armenia’s historic and foremost partner. Russian failure to defend Armenia during the 2020 and 2023 wars pushed Yerevan to recalibrate and deepen relations with other partners, especially with the European Union and the United States. Relations with the EU have seen particular momentum, marked by deepening economic, political, and security ties.
Second, a decision to pursue peace and normalisation of ties with Azerbaijan. The process has been criticised domestically by many for conceding too much to Azerbaijan. It gained significant traction last summer with the initialling of a provisional peace agreement mediated by the US. A diplomatic breakthrough, and although criticised for lack of detail and under pressure as a result of the Iran War, the agreement may be the one genuinely successful peace initiative undertaken by the Trump administration (Foreign Policy, 08/04/2026). Its standout provision is the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in Southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave and onto Turkey. In parallel, Armenia under Pashinyan has pursued a normalisation of relations with Turkey.
Together, both these policy choices have the potential to durably and profoundly reshape Armenia’s international positioning and broader dynamics in the South Caucasus region. Russia will very likely remain a preponderant partner - the two countries remain tied by geography, common institutions, structural dependencies, and significant Russian stakes throughout the Armenian economy. But the ongoing recalibration, if sustained, will over time reduce Russian leverage in the region. The peace agreement with Azerbaijan is fundamental in this regard, with the conflict historically a key reason behind Russian influence in the region.
Moreover, through its provisions relating to connectivity and infrastructure (to date, the borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed), the peace agreement opens up the possibility for Armenia of becoming a key node and participant in the trade networks connecting Asia and Europe. The latter would add to the country’s positive economic trajectory - GDP has more than doubled since 2018, and growth remains strong at over 5% in 2025 (World Bank, Fall 2025).
Electoral tensions focus on peace and the foreign policy agenda
The peace process with Azerbaijan has been the defining issue of the election build-up so far. Pashinyan has pitched the vote as a choice between peace and war, going as far as warning that hostilities with Azerbaijan could resume in September if his party fails to win a majority (Armenian Weekly, 26/03/2026). The main opposition parties - the Armenian Alliance bloc led by former President Robert Kocharyan and the Strong Armenian Party led by the Armenian-Russian billionaire businessman Samvel Karapetyan - have pushed back and accused the government of using inflammatory rhetoric for political gain.
While some analysts and observers have also pushed back on the ‘pro-war’ characterisation of opposition parties, others have sounded caution. For Michael Zolyan - a historian, independent political analyst, and former MP in the Pashinyan-led MyStep Alliance (2018-2021) - the suggestion that a Pashinyan defeat would lead to war by September is an exaggeration. However, Zolyan adds, it would constitute a real threat to the peace process nonetheless due to the likelihood that opposition parties, influenced by Russia, would seek to renegotiate aspects of the agreement, including its infrastructure provisions. Robert Ghenvodyan, a political scientist and expert at the Armenian Council, a think tank, echoes this view and considers that only Pashinyan and Civil Contract would be able to continue the peace process while avoiding Russian interference.
Whatever the merits of this framing, the peace versus war narrative has fanned an already tense political climate. Media organisations have accused the ruling party of leading Armenia into democratic backsliding and Pashinyan of consolidating and personalising power around himself (CIVILNET, 30/12/2025). In parallel, contributing to the polarisation of political debate, the prime minister is in an acrimonious and long-standing conflict with the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, whose leadership has historically maintained close ties with Russian religious and political elites (Eurasianet, 26/02/2026).
To counter these criticisms, the government has justified actions perceived as anti-democratic as necessary to counter threats posed by foreign interference. While it has treaded carefully and avoided explicit criticism of Russia, the hybrid ways in which the Kremlin is able to exercise influence in the country are significant, in particular through information campaigns and political networks (Eurasianet, 31/03/2026). The EU has deployed teams at the request of the government to help it deal with these threats, though it is unclear whether this will have much effect.
Conclusions and outlook
The attention around the elections, in particular from foreign powers, highlights the geopolitical stakes. Russia wishes to discredit the current administration as a means to safeguard its position as Armenia’s preponderant partner. The EU, in turn, will be looking to avoid a repeat of developments in Georgia since 2024, where democratic backsliding has led to a significant deterioration of relations and effectively halted the country’s accession process.
The outcome of the vote remains very uncertain at this stage. A public opinion survey commissioned by the International Republican Institute in early February 2026 indicated that 24% of respondents said they would vote for Pashinyan and Civil Contract if an election were held the following week, with the next highest level of support expressed at around 9% for Karapetyan and the Strong Armenia Alliance, and 30% of respondents stating they were undecided. It appears that momentum may be gathering behind Pashinyan, who has been on the campaign trail for several weeks already. Polling by the local news outlet EVNReport in February-March indicated that the prime minister’s approval ratings stood at 47%, up from 36% based on a first wave of polling in January-February.
Others remain more measured in their assessments. Eric Hacopian, the leading political commentator at the independent local news outlet CIVILNET, says that while it is clear that the administration has the largest minority support, it is equally clear that they do not have more than half of voters’ support. While this raises the possibility of the need for coalition partners to secure a parliamentary majority, Hacopian suggests that the confrontational campaigning approach of the ruling party will likely have alienated potential partners.
In any case, the elections are set to mark a major democratic moment in Armenia’s history. Michael Zoyan, the historian and former MP, pushing back on arguments that the Pashinyan administration is overseeing democratic backsliding, stressed that Armenia was still a “young democracy.” Like many other democratic countries, he added, it faces the challenge of balancing between upholding democratic freedoms and the need to address challenges to democratic governance.
Source: This commentary was prepared by Alex Vergé for the Armenian Election Monitor 2026. Mr Vergé is a freelance writer and political analyst, specialising in geopolitics and international relations. For more information: Alex Vergé | LinkedIn
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