Economy

In recent days, Uzbekistan welcomed the Chinese and American governments in quick succession. During Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit on 17-18 October, the Uzbek presidential administration said that joint projects backed by firm agreements had reached nearly $60 billion. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio then arrived in Samarkand for C5+1 talks, accompanied at the time by American business leaders seeking contracts, particularly in critical minerals. During the visit, Uzbekistan announced 54 agreements covering trade, investment, and technology. The agreements are said to be worth a total of $12 billion, according to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade. However, China still accounts for 23% of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade in January-August 2026, while US goods trade with Uzbekistan totalled at $1.05 billion in 2025, which is less than a fifteenth of the value of its trade with China. Rubio said Washington was not asking Central Asian countries to stop cooperating with other partners, but would instead compete for investment. Tashkent is likely to welcome investment from both sides, but the trade gap shows how challenging it will be if it were to decrease its dependence on Beijing. “Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Uzbekistan on October 17–18, just ahead of United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who arrived in Samarkand on October 18 with a delegation of American business leaders seeking new contracts. While China already has a substantial presence in Uzbek manufacturing and energy, Washington is seeking to expand American involvement in critical minerals and technology. The visits highlight the growing competition between the world’s two largest economies for influence in Central Asia. On October 17, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received Li Qiang. According to the Uzbek presidential administration, the portfolio of joint projects backed by firm agreements has reached nearly $60 billion. More than 6,000 joint ventures with Chinese participation have been established in Uzbekistan. (...) Construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway was another topic of discussion. Work officially began in December 2024. The route will cross mountainous areas of Kyrgyzstan and connect the railway networks of China and Uzbekistan. The 304-kilometer section through Kyrgyzstan alone is estimated to cost $4.7 billion and will require 50 bridges and 29 tunnels. (...) On October 19, Rubio attended talks in Samarkand under the C5+1 format, bringing together the U.S. and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented in Samarkand. Companies were discussing agreements potentially worth billions of dollars, with concrete announcements expected following the meetings. Among Washington’s priorities are critical minerals used in advanced technologies, including electronics and batteries.”

In this analysis for commonspace.eu, Anna Szedlacsek argues that Kazakhstan and Armenia, two countries that Russia had considered in its sphere of influence, appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. Armenia and Kazakhstan both reached their strategic turning points between 2020 and 2022, driven by security failures, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and severe economic vulnerabilities.  Among these reasons, the war in Ukraine sheds a particularly long shadow. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s “special military operation” substantially damaged Moscow's image among ordinary Kazakh citizens and reignited anxieties about revanchist Russian rhetoric regarding northern Kazakhstan. Almaty is heavily challenged by having to navigate its deep economic and transit interdependence with Russia. Kazakhstan is aggressively developing alternative transport links, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) through Baku, Azerbaijan, to reach European and global markets without crossing Russian territory. This also reflects a move away from Russia as its main trading partner – this position has been earned by China, or, if considered as a bloc, the European Union (EU). Armenia, on the other hand, began its pivot away from Moscow’s orbit after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and reached a point of no return following Azerbaijan's final capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This is due to the fact that despite hosting a Russian military base and belonging to the CSTO, Armenia received no military assistance from Russia during either of these conflicts. Moscow remained neutral – and thus turned untrustworthy in the eyes of Armenians – because it wished to safeguard its expanding economic, energy, and transit partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Armenian parliament also passed a law to initiate the EU accession process, while ministries are recruiting Western-educated professionals to restructure the civil service away from the Kremlin. The question, is not simply whether Russia is losing its allies. It is whether Russia is losing its ability to make those allies dependent on it. As of September 2026, the evidence does not point to a definitive answer. Russia has not been pushed out of either country – but both Kazakhstan and Armenia appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. (click the image to read the analysis in full)