The rise of Péter Magyar has transformed Hungarian politics from a stagnant contest into a genuine struggle over the country’s geopolitical future. Once associated with the orbit of Viktor Orbán’s ruling system, Magyar now presents himself as the figure who can bring Hungary back into the European mainstream. His message is direct: Hungary must strengthen its position within the European Union and secure its place in the West, “where it has always belonged.” Yet, no matter how compelling this western pivot sounds, Magyar would inherit a state whose institutions and energy system remain deeply entangled with Russia. For years, Orbán silently intensified relationships with Moscow. Hungary has benefited from cheap gas and oil contracts, with Russian crude making up 93% of Hungary’s oil imports in 2025, representing a 32% increase from 2021. Another key project is the Paks II nuclear power plant, agreed upon in 2014 by Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin, with the Russian Rosatom acting as the main contractor. Lastly, the leaked conversation between Putin and Orbán, as well as Péter Szijjártó’s, Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, calls to Sergey Lavrov, his Russian counterpart during breaks in EU Council meetings, have resulted in Fidesz being viewed by many Hungarians (and others) as catering to Russian interests. (Read the full article by clicking on the image above.)

As part of our "Armenia Season" on commonspace.eu, journalist Alex Vergé , writing from Yerevan, reflects on the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia. He says that "the attention around the elections, in particular from foreign powers, highlights the geopolitical stakes. Russia wishes to discredit the current administration as a means to safeguard its position as Armenia’s preponderant partner. The EU, in turn, will be looking to avoid a repeat of developments in Georgia since 2024, where democratic backsliding has led to a significant deterioration of relations and effectively halted the country’s accession process." He adds, that " the outcome of the vote remains very uncertain at this stage". A public opinion survey commissioned by the International Republican Institute in early February 2026 indicated that 24% of respondents said they would vote for Pashinyan and Civil Contract if an election were held the following week, with the next highest level of support expressed at around 9% for Karapetyan and the Strong Armenia Alliance, and 30% of respondents stating they were undecided. It appears that momentum may be gathering behind Pashinyan, who has been on the campaign trail for several weeks already. Polling by the local news outlet EVNReport in February-March indicated that the prime minister’s approval ratings stood at 47%, up from 36% based on a first wave of polling in January-February. Others remain more measured in their assessments. Eric Hacopian, the leading political commentator at the independent local news outlet CIVILNET, says that while it is clear that the administration has the largest minority support, it is equally clear that they do not have more than half of voters’ support. While this raises the possibility of the need for coalition partners to secure a parliamentary majority, Hacopian suggests that the confrontational campaigning approach of the ruling party will likely have alienated potential partners. In any case, the elections are set to mark a major democratic moment in Armenia’s history. Michael Zoyan, the historian and former MP, pushing back on arguments that the Pashinyan administration is overseeing democratic backsliding, stressed that Armenia was still a “young democracy.” Like many other democratic countries, he added, it faces the challenge of balancing between upholding democratic freedoms and the need to address challenges to democratic governance. (Click image to read the full commentary).

Lebanon is on the brink. Yesterday, Wednesday 8 April, Israel conducted a vicious attack on civilian targets across the Lebanese capital, Beirut. Hundreds of people were killed. Thousands lost their homes, adding to the hundreds of thousands already displaced in the last three weeks. An already fragile Lebanon is now on the brink. The international community - and especially Europe - must now step up to save Lebanon. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu, Alexandra Dumitrescu says  Israel has made claims that it intends to continue its occupation and possibly even annex southern Lebanon. Israel's finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, said on 23 March that Israel should extend its border with Lebanon up to the Litani ​River. Since then, all of the Litani’s main bridge crossings have been bombed and severely damaged, if not fully destroyed. As Maha Yahya, the Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, put it in her article for Foreign Affairs, “By joining the battle, Hezbollah inextricably tied Lebanon’s fate to the larger war. But it is also clear that Israel is using the war and Hezbollah’s provocations to justify a much larger—and potentially devastating—assault on Lebanon itself.” (Click the image to read her op-ed in full).

Ilia II, Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia died on Tuesday (17 March) at the age of 93. He had been leader of the Orthodox Church in Georgia since 1977. Dennis Sammut wrote this obituary for commonspace.eu: I met Patriarch Ilia for the first time in March 1992, on my first visit to Georgia. I was accompanied to the Patriarchate by Zurab Zhvania and Ghia Baramidze. When we entered the Patriarch’s office, Zurab Zhvania shook his hand, Ghia Baramizde kissed it. The Patriarch was in a short-sleeved shirt, and throughout our conversation, he woke up from his chair several times to answer phone calls. It was a very relaxed meeting in a very difficult moment in Georgia’s history. Georgia, recently independent after the collapse of the USSR, was in complete chaos. Edward Shevardndze had come back from Moscow a few days before to head the State Council, but there was little sign of government. When I next met Ilia II a few years later, it was a different meeting. He was sitting on his throne in full robes. The conversation was more formal. Ilia II had made the transition to become the leader we are more familiar with. Between them Shevardnadze and Ilia II saved Georgia in that difficult period: Shevardnadze was instrumental on the margins, ensuring the loyalty of the large and restless Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities, and the now disempowered but still influential nomenklatura. But it was Ilia II who controlled the hearts of the Georgian heartland, and he understood what needed to be done as Georgia continued to implode, often as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Russian instigation and support. Ilia II was born in Vladikafkaz, modern day North Ossetia, to a Georgian Orthodox family, he studied at the Moscow Theological from 1956 to 1960. Ilia served as Bishop of Simokhedi from 1963 to 1967 and as bishop of Sukhumi and Abkhazia from 1967 to 1977. He also led the church's external relations department from 1964 to 1977. He was elected Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia in 1977. During his tenure, Ilia II led the growth and restoration of the Church in Georgia. During the Shevardnadze years, until 2003, Ilia II was able to position the Church as an important player in the Georgian state and society. This relationship became more complicated in the Saakashvili era that followed from 2003-2012. Under the Ivanishvili since, the Church has remained important, bot boxed in. It is riddled by internal divisions and accusations of corruption. For more than a decade Ilia II has been frail, and many say that he lost control. But his personality and presence ensured at least nominal unity of the church, and no one dared to question his word too loudly. His death creates a vacuum. There is a danger that the church will divide, or that a faction will take hold of it. This will have implications for the country. Georgia already has a very polorised political scene. The Patriarch was the last symbol of unity. The next days and weeks will be testing for the Georgian Orthodox Church and Georgian society. The death of Ilia II is not only the end of an era in Georgia. It marks a break with a past that no longer exists. But for many Georgians, a new present has not yet started. Source: This obituary was prepared for commonspace.eu by Dennis Sammut