South Caucasus

The year 2025 has ended up being a momentous year for the South Caucasus, writes Dennis Sammut in his Monday Commentary. Armenia-Azerbaijan relations have been redefined, and that has consequences for the whole region, and beyond. That huge development overshadowed key moments in the domestic trajectory of the two countries, that however have deep consequences for the two countries, and even beyond. It has also been a tumultuous year for Georgia too. The country has been gripped in political crisis throughout 2025, with no obvious end in sight. Whatever the domestic arguments, on the international stage Georgia is today a shadow of what it used to be until recently. It not only has lost the chance of joining the European Union any time soon, it has also lost its position as the leading South Caucasus country. Today, in the new reality of the region, it lags as a tired third. Important as 2025 was, it ends with a lot of unfinished business. So 2026 will also be crucial for the three countries. Since regaining their statehood in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia-Azerbaijan relations were defined by war. The two fought open wars, wars of attrition, and propaganda wars, incessantly. Tens of thousands of people lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. Many had lost hope that the two could try the alternative – i.e. peaceful co-existence. Yet in 2025 they were proven wrong.

There is no denying that the EU, especially key member states acting in support, helped bring Baku and Yerevan closer to the Washington Declaration of August 8, 2025. But a declaration is not a treaty. Turning principles into a peace deal and eventually to a sustainable peace requires consistent long-term European involvement, writes Yalchin Mammadov in this-op-ed for commonspace.eu Before facilitating trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU is first expected to address its own credibility gap with Baku. A more balanced approach—such as including Azerbaijan, alongside Armenia, in the European Peace Facility—could be a useful first step. Diplomats can negotiate peace; societies must build peace. In this context, the EU can do what it does the best: long-term societal engagement. By expanding youth and academic exchange programmes, investing in cross-border civil society initiatives, and fostering people-to-people cooperation, Brussels can help shape a new generation equipped to sustain peace beyond political cycles. Such tools are slow and unglamorous, but if ignored, even the strongest treaty risks collapse. And obviously, these aspects require two-way engagement and genuine willingness by both governments to facilitate contact. If Brussels wants to remain influential, it needs to replace outdated one-size-fits-all policies with ambitious, interest-driven and differentiated approaches. Without a clear regional strategy, which appears to be the current situation, the South Caucasus will continue to sit at the margins of Europe’s security architecture—leaving space for other powers to take the lead. (You can read the op-ed in full by clicking the image.)