It has been a roller-coaster sort of week for EU relations with the South Caucasus. It started on Wednesday (8 November), with the decision of the European Commission to recommend that Georgia be recognized as a Candidate Country, opening the way for eventual membership. By Tuesday, (14 November) the Foreign Affairs Council was considering providing military assistance to Armenia through possible assistance from the European Peace Facility. In the days in-between relations between the EU and Azerbaijan appeared to have dipped to their lowest point in a decade, with Azerbaijan accusing the EU of inciting separatism. Except that on Wednesday (15 November), the Azerbaijani presidential foreign policy aide surfaced in Brussels where he was told that Azerbaijan was an important partner for the EU in the South Caucasus and that the EU will continue to support the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process to advance a peaceful and prosperous South Caucasus. One would like to think that all this was part of some grand strategy. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov seems to think so, accusing the EU of trying to oust Russia out of the South Caucasus (and Central Asia). But a closer look at this week’s events suggest that the EU is doing, what it often does: muddling along, reacting to events and situations rather than fulfilling some grand strategy. This is risky, and the EU needs to develop a strategic framework for dealing with the South Caucasus. There is an urgent need for the European Union to develop a strategic perspective towards the region that is based on realism, and that has enough support from different stakeholders – Commission, Member States; Parliament – for it to be credible. Developing a comprehensive EU strategy will take time and will require an alignment of different views and interests that may take months, if not years, to achieve. In the meantime however, the EU should have the ambition to publish by early Spring 2024 a short but ambitious statement of intent with its vision for the region that may provide a framework around which different ad hoc policies and initiatives can be organized. The first half of 2024 may offer a window of opportunity for this to happen.

The ongoing conflict, and accompanying humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza has cast a shadow over the entire Middle East. It is clear that no Arab country can now avoid being embroiled in one way or another. Pictures of the suffering that the Palestinian people in Gaza have to endure on a daily basis fill the screens of all news programmes, and on social media the situation is hotly debated. Arabs are overwhelmingly incensed that the world allows the suffering of the Palestinian people to continue. For the young generation, especially in the Gulf, this is the first exposure to a crisis of this kind. No doubt, the present atmosphere adds to the radicalisation of some among this generation. Those countries that only very recently took the bold step of establishing relations with Israel now face criticism which they cannot ignore. One of these countries, Bahrain, on Thursday (2 November) recalled its Ambassador to Israel and suspended economic ties. Earlier, Saudi Arabia stepped back from the process of normalising relations with Israel, and has become a very vocal critic of Israeli policy.

Over the last few weeks, the president of Azerbaijan, and the prime ministers of Armenia and Georgia, have made separate calls for regional co-operation among the three South Caucasus countries, highlighting the benefits that can come out from such co-operation. This is a big shift in positions, especially for Azerbaijan. There is no doubt that regional co-operation can bring great benefits to the three countries and the wider region. The three leaders need to get together and ideally sign some kind of joint declaration outlining their regional vision. Work on this should start at senior diplomat level as soon as possible. There is an alternative vision to the trilateral regional co-operation, and this is the idea of adding to the core three South Caucasus countries, the three regional neighbours: Russia, Iran and Turkey. Meetings in this format, with the Georgians absent, have taken place in Moscow and Tehran. Those pushing for this format, whether consciously or unconsciously, are trying to destroy the idea of South Caucasus regional co-operation between the three core countries. Most things that can be done between the three (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), cannot be done between the six. The 3 + 3 – useful only once the Georgians join, can be a talking shop. No doubt someone will come up after with the idea of the 3 + 2 – providing a forum between the three South Caucasus countries and the EU and US that can be yet another talking shop. But realistically, neither can form the basis of regional co-operation. It is clear that in the South Caucasus three is a company but six is a crowd.

For decades, Russia has tried to protect its interests in the South Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But Russia had nothing to offer to the countries of the region, be it for their economic and political challenges, or even more importantly for the process of restoring peace in the region after it slid into conflict at the end of the Soviet era. There was however one thing that it could do, and that was to spoil any efforts for peace and reconciliation, if these efforts did not originate and were managed by Russia itself. This way it could maintain it primordial position in the region, and as much as possible, keep everyone else out, whilst often presenting itself as an exemplary peacemaker. This grotesque situation has played itself out in front of everyone’s eyes since 1992. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have for most of the time had no choice but to play along with the Russian masquerade, and the international community, most of the time distracted by other issues, generally played along, being content to be seen offering some kind of balance to Russian posturing. Russia never had, and certainly does not have now, any interest in working genuinely with international partners to support peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If a dialogue with Russia is necessary so that Russia will not be a spoiler, than that dialogue is futile because Russian objectives are not the same as those of the West. Russia’s gloating when Azerbaijani president Aliyev failed to turn up for a crucial summit in Granada last week is a case in point. We are now already seeing Russian rhetoric increase as preparations for the long-expected meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan, with Michel, scheduled for later this month, intensify. Russian pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan ahead of the Brussels meeting is also increasing both overtly and covertly. There is an argument that Armenia and Azerbaijan simply cannot afford to be seen agreeing with each other, under the auspices of Brussels, without the Russians being part of the story. Thus there has been in recent weeks some frantic discussions about how that could be done, including by having the final lap of any discussions in Tbilisi, without any outside mediators. Such ideas have also found favour in Tehran and Ankara. A wonderful idea, but one that has many flaws. Any agreement will need to be somehow underpinned by some kind of international patronage. And “ownership” will also determine who is going to pick up the bill for post-conflict reconstruction and other costs of erasing the scars of the conflict from the region, including for example demining. Still, Tbilisi may be a venue that more or less can be acceptable to both the Russians as well as to the Europeans and the Americans. In the end, the location of the symbolic finishing line must not turn out to be the most important issue. All focus, and all efforts must be concentrated on getting Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree to finally put an end to this long painful episode in their history, that has taken the lives of tens of thousands, displaced hundreds of thousands and costed billions. And that would be just the end of the beginning because translating a written agreement into concrete actions that would ensure lasting and durable peace will be a much longer and more difficult endeavour.

The dramatic events of the last days in Karabakh brought to a climax decades of political crisis, confrontation and war that, since 1989, has resulted in tens of thousands of people dead, even more, injured, and hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought a war in the early 1990s that resulted in an Armenian victory, and another one in 2020, that resulted in an Armenian defeat. In between, and since, there were many skirmishes, and untold animosity that expressed itself in all sorts of ways. The Karabakh conflict has destabilised the entire South Caucasus region, preventing regional cooperation, frustrating economic development and exposing the region to the manipulation of outside forces. On 19 September, Azerbaijan appeared to finally put an end to the problem through a short but sharp military operation that essentially wiped out the military capability of the Karabakh Armenians. Yet again hundreds died on both sides, and the world is now watching the latest wave of South Caucasus refugees on the move, as almost the entire Armenian population of Karabakh seeks refugee in Armenia. Many consider that the problem has not been resolved – it has simply changed. To understand why events unfolded as they did, and why efforts over decades by the world’s leading countries and statesmen failed to find a solution to this problem it is essential to understand that Karabakh is not one issue, but three: each with its own narrative, and quite persuasive justification. The big question however remains, will there be Armenians living in Karabakh going forward, and under what conditions? Conditions need to be created for Karabakh to become a multi-ethnic community within Azerbaijan. Its specific Armenian linguistic and cultural characteristics should be preserved. All those displaced since 1989 should have a right to return to build together this community. The onus now depends on Azerbaijan to create the right conditions for this to happen, and they will be well-advised to work with credible international partners in doing so. Karabakh is never going to be peaceful, and it is never going to be complete, until its Armenian and Azerbaijani populations are back and living together in peace and prosperity.

Despite the sweltering heat, officials in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia appeared to have taken little if any vacations this summer. The usual exodus to the beaches, or to cool mountain resorts, sometimes stretching from mid-July to mid-September, simply did not happen. In one capital, one observer commented that officials were at their desks throughout the summer. An air of uncertainty prevailed over the region. Low-intensity border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan threatened the fragile peace process. More dead and injured were added to the long list of victims of this conflict. Azerbaijan’s decision to assert its control over the Lachin corridor that connects the Armenian population of Karabakh to Armenia created hardships for the Karabakh Armenians, who on their part refuse to be supplied through alternative Azerbaijani routes. Inside Karabakh the political turmoil finally ended the fate of the de facto president, Arayik Harutyunyan, who resigned this week, adding to the instability. A meeting of the UN Security Council on 16 August discussed the Lachin issue. Concern was expressed by UNSC members, and most called on Azerbaijan to restore unhindered movement across the Lachin Corridor. But there was no consensus on a resolution, or even a Statement. In Georgia, summer ended as it started, with a permanent stand-off between the governing “Georgian Dream” party and the fractured opposition. The issue of whether or not Georgia will get EU candidate status before the end of the year continued to dominate the political discourse. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, whose constitutional powers are mostly ceremonial, defied government advice and travelled to Europe at the beginning of September for talks with European leaders, who rolled out the red carpet to her. But in Tbilisi, the governing party started impeachment proceedings against her. They are likely to fail because the government is not able to muster the necessary votes needed in the parliament. Some simply dismiss the summer shenanigans as part of the usual South Caucasus political fare. Unfortunately, there is more to it than that, and the restless summer may be the harbinger of a very difficult autumn.

On Saturday, 15 July, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan once again met in Brussels, under the auspices of the president of the European Council Charles Michel, to discuss the future of the relations between their two countries after years of war and conflict. Those who hoped for a dramatic breakthrough in the past in the process of Armenia - Azerbaijan normalisation, may have been disappointed at how slow the process moved. Yet progress is being made, and yesterday, speaking after the meeting in Brussels, European Council president Charles Michel summed it up, saying "We are going through one of the most comprehensive and vigorous stages of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Those who still think that peace is a "moment" are mistaken. It is a process that needs to develop step by step. The meeting in Brussels this weekend was certainly a step in the right direction.